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COMMODITIES  AND  STABEX 
============================================================= 
============================================================= 
IN  THE  BEGINNING  WERE  PRIMARY  PRODUCTS ••• 
------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------
Such  an  obvious  statement might well  be  the  beginning of an 
economic  treatise and  would  in itself be  sufficient to 
justify the  importance  the  world  attaches to this question. 
The  adjective underlines  the  fact  that prosperity is founded 
on  primary products.  But  sometimes  the  foundations cen slip. 
This  is not a  new  problem.  Back  in 1948,  the  Havana  Charter 
recognized  the perversity of  the  raw material markets  : 
" •••  The  conditions  under which  some  primary commodities are 
produced,  exchange  and  consumed  are  such that international 
trade  in these  commodities  may  be  affected  by  special 
difficulties such as  the  tendency  towards persistent 
disequilibrium between  production and  consumption,  the 
accumulation of  burdensome  stock and  pronounced  fluctuation 
in prices.  These  special difficulties may  have  serious 
adverse effects on  the  interests of producers  and  consumers, 
as well  as widespread  repercussions  jeopardizing the general 
policy of economic  expansion •••  " 
What  is new  is the  importance  the question took on  in  the 
seventies.  The  trigger was  the oil crisis of 1973,  when,  for 
the first time  in history,  developing countries which 
exported  one  particular raw material  succeeded  in forcing  on -2-
the  industrialized countries  something  which  decades  of 
negotiations  had  failed  to  manage,  namely  a  price which  they 
considered  to  be  remunerative.  The  newly  independent Third 
world  had  realized that,  if it wanted  to  jump  on  the world 
trade  roundabout,  the precondition for  rapid  economic  take-
off,  then it should  stop selling its raw materials at 
knock-down  prices.  These,  obviously,  were all it had  to 
finance  its growth  in  the short  term. 
A  fair price,  terms  of trade which  were  not constantly 
deteriorating,  was  a  vital demand  for  the  developing 
countries. 
Fair prices and  guaranteed  supplies were  the  main  concern of 
the  consumer  countries after the war  in  the  Middle  East. 
There  had  to  be  a  dialogue.  There  was  going  to  be  one,  but 
it soon  became  apparent  that,  although  the  aim of stabilizing 
the  markets  remained  the  same,  there were  many  different 
situations.  Who  were  the  consumers  ?  Who  were  the  producers 
What  was  the  product hierarchy  ?  What  systems of regulation 
should  be  used  ?  These  were  just some  of the questions  that 
occurred.  The  variety of  situations threatened  to prevent 
the  commodity  problem  from  being globalized as  the  countries 
of  the  Third world  wished. 
Almost  10  years  of  North-South  Dialogue  have,  alas,  confirmed 
that it is difficult to achieve really satisfactory results. 
Optimists will  feel  that  the  Integrated  Programme  for 
Commodities  and  the  new product agreements  are  a  partial 
success  and  pessimists that  they are  a  partial failure.  The 
pragmatic will  look at the  results - they are slender and  the 
basic problem  has  not been  solved.  The  markets  in  fact still 
fluctuate  as  much  as  they ever  did  and  the experts  now  agree 
that,  one  or  two  exceptional cases apart,  the  developing 
countries'  income  is on  the  decline. -3-
The  consequences  are  cause  for concern to us all.  Many 
developing  countries are  threatened with financial 
suffocation and  the  risk of chain reactions on  the  banking 
system  in  the  industrialized world  is not  a  negligeable one. 
In  this context,  the  real meaning of the  various devices  the 
European  Community  has  introduced  to stabilize the export 
earnings of its developing  partners becomes  clear.  Although 
its action is only partial and  not  intended  to solve  the 
problems  as  world  level,  it does  have  the merit of existing 
and  being one  possible  avenue  for more  general  international 
action. -4-
PART  I 
============================================================= 
COMMODITIES  :  THE  KEY  TO  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  THIRD  WORLD 
============================================================= 
============================================================= 
I.  WORLD  TRADE  IN  COMMODITIES 
============================================================= 
" •••  any  product of  farm,  forest or fishery or any mineral, 
in its natural  form or which  has  undergone  such processing  as 
is customarily required  to prepare it for marketing  in 
substantial volume  in international trade." 
This  is how  the  Havana  Charter describes commodities. 
As  the  figures  show,  raw materials represent a  very  important 
part of world  trade- 17  % of  the  value of total exports  from 
the  industrialized and  the  developing countries  in 1980.  Add 
fuel  (and oil,  therefore)  to this and  the  figure  rises to 
41  %. 
The  commonest  idea is that raw materials are  the Third World, 
but  a  look at the  structure of  trade  shows  there  is more  to 
it than this.  In  particular, it is wrong  to equate  the 
industrialized countries with  the  consumers of raw materials 
and  the developing  countries with the  producers.  The 
industrialized countries  in fact account  for almost  two 
thirds of  the  value of world  exports  in this sector.  And  the 
export patterns of  the different groups of countries are  not 
comparable either.  The  industrialized countries of  the  west 
and  the  countries of  the  eastern block do most of their 
export trade  in their own  zone.  But  the developing  countries -5-
only do  a  small  amount  of trade with each other and  the bulk 
of their export trade,  overall,  is with  the  industrialized 
countries of the west. 
So  the  developing  countries  tend  to be  equated with  the 
suppliers of  raw materials not because  they dominate  the 
world  markets,  far  from it, but because  they are  the only 
ones  to  be  preponderant suppliers of  the other two, 
particularly the western group. 
Another  important aspect of North-South  trade is this.  The 
developing  countries are very large  importers of  food 
products  and  their dependence  on  the countries of the west 
has  increased  considerably in this respect,  particularly as 
far as  cereals are  concerned. 
The  North's  market  dominance 
The  picture of  the  world  raw material  trade  we  have  just 
painted  can  be  completed  by  the data for individual products. 
Calculations made  on  the basis of  a  statistical note 
produced  by  UN  experts  in preparation for  the extraordinary 
general  assembly  in April  1974  made  it possible  to measure 
the  importance of each of  the  three big groups of countries 
on  the different markets.  Although this note dates  back  a 
relatively long  time,  its conclusions are still valid.  The 
66  products on  the  UN  lists can  be  divided  into three 
categories  : 
1)  The  developing  countries dominate  the markets  (18  products 
for which  they account for more  than  60  % of world 
exports)  - crude oil,  coffee,  sugar,  rubber,  cocoa,  tin, 
tea,  bauxite,  groundnuts,  palm oil,  coconut oil, jute, 
groundnut oil,  copra,  sisal,  tin ore,  palm kernel oil and 
palm nuts. -6-
2.  The  developing  countries have  an  appreciable  market  (10 
products for which  they accounts  for 30-60  % of world 
trade)  - petroleum products,  copper,  cotton,  fruit,  iron 
ore,  timber,  oilseed cake  and  meal,  copper ore,  untreated 
fertilizer and  manganese  ore. 
3.  The  industrialized countries of  the North  dominate  the 
markets  (37  products for which  they account for  more  than 
60  % of world  trade)  - wheat,  wood  pulp,  pressed wood, 
aluminium,  coal,  maize,  beef  and  veal,  wool,  fish,  soya, 
tobacco,  nickel,  rice,  milk,  leather, cheese,  butter, 
wine,  barley,  pigmeat,  nickel ore,  fur,  animal oils and 
fats,  lead,  zinc,  sheepmeat,  bacon,  soya oil, poultry, 
zinc ore,  eggs,  olive oil,  lead ore,  flax,  linseed, 
cottonseed oil and  linseed oil. 
Note  that the  66  products  include  chrome ore,  where  the 
eastern block countries dominate  the market,  with  40  % of 
exports.  The  other products  for which  the eastern bloc 
accounts  for more  than  15  % of world exports are coal,  flax, 
pressed wood  and  timber,  untreated fertilizer,  cotton and 
manganese ore.  The eastern bloc's most  important  import 
products,  relatively speaking,  are palm nuts,  linseed, 
cotton,  sugar,  barley,  wheat,  linseed oil, wine,  untreated 
fertilizer,  rubber  and  poultry.  The  table based on  UN  expert 
statistics shows  that the  industrialized countries of the 
North  tend  to have  an  important hold on  the various world 
markets. -7-
============================================================= 
II.  THE  VITAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  COMMODITIES  TO  THE  THIRD  WORLD 
============================================================= 
The  developing  countries'  dependance  in  the  commodities 
sector was  inherited  from  the  colonial era.  That  is a  fact. 
These  countries were  confined  to  the  role of purveyors of  raw 
materials to  the  industries  in  the metropolis  and prevented 
from  developing  their own  processing  industries, which might 
have  represented  unwanted  competition. 
With  independence,  came  the  Third World's  desire for 
technology  and  to develop its own  commodities.  It wanted  to 
industrialize. 
More  than  a  quarter of a  century after decolonization,  the 
record  is far  from  satisfactory.  The  Third World  as  a  whole 
is still largely under-industrialized,  it has  a  considerable 
external debt,  it has  been  unable  to ward  off famine  properly 
and  its share  of world  trade  in manufactures  is still small. 
It is still,  in fact,  largely dependent  on its raw material 
exports. 
These  provide most  of  the developing  countries'  foreign 
exchange  and  much  of  the national  budgets as well,  via  the 
taxes  levied  on  export products.  This  means  that any major 
drop  in earnings may  have  dramatic  consequences  on  their 
economy. 
It goes without  saying  that the  developing countries are 
anxious  to maintain their purchasing  power  - which  conditions 
all their development possibilities.  A very old debate, 
reflecting this concern,  hinges  on  the notion of  the 
improvement or the  deterioration of  the  terms of  trade. -8-
The  concern of  the  industrialized countries - some  of which, 
like the  countries of  the  EEC  and  Japan,  are dependent  for  a 
large part of  their  raw materials on external  sources  - is to 
ensure  that their  industries are supplied regularly and at a 
reasonable cost. 
Here  we  are at the  heart of  a  contradiction in relations 
between  the  developed  and  the  developing  countries.  Although 
the  former  have  bitter memories of  the  record prices of 
1973-1974  and  are  anxious  to maintain  raw material prices at 
levels which  do  not  threaten  the  balance of their external 
accounts or  their growth,  the latter,  in  theory,  have  only 
one  way  of avoiding  financial  suffocation and  that is pushing 
up  their export earnings,  which,  as  we  know,  are almost  80  % 
dependent  on  their commodity  sales. 
============================================================= 
III.  NOT  ALL  IN  THE  SAME  BOAT 
============================================================= 
Developing  countries depend  on  commodities  for  their export 
earnings  - that is  the  traditional picture and it will  be  a 
true one  for  a  number  of years  to  come.  However,  things  have 
evolved  over  the  past decades,  which  is fortunate.  It is 
increasingly necessary to make  a  distinction  between  two 
groups of  developing  countries - those  that are off to a 
good  start and  exporting more  and  more  processed  products 
(even  if,  in certain cases,  their financial situation vis-a-
vis  the outside world  is still extremely precarious)  and 
those  that now  make  up  the  group of  least-developed countries 
for which  commodities,  and  particularly agricultural 
products,  are  almost  the only source of export earnings. -9-
As  the world  Bank  underlines  in its 1983  report  :  "Developing 
countries can  no  longer be  caricatured as exporters of 
primary products  and  importers of manufactures.  Some  have 
even  become  significant exporters of capital goods, 
accounting  in all for  about  6  percent of  the world's  total. 
These  changes  should  not obscure  the  fact that for  many 
developing  countries - particularly the poorest - primary 
products still dominate  their exports.  Many  countries are 
still highly dependent  on  one export  commodity1  coffee still 
represents almost  90  percent of Burundi's  recorded exports 
and  more  than  50  percent of Colombia's.  Other examples 
include  cocoa  in Ghana  (70  percent),  sugar  in Mauritius  (more 
than  65  percent)  and  copper  in  Zambia  (more  than  70 
percent)." 
To  say that,  for  these countries,  and all the others  in 
comparable  situations,  any  drop  in  the world price of these 
products  is catastrophic,  is self evident.  If coffee prices 
slump or there  is a  vast cocoa harvest in  the world,  then 
Burundi  and  Ghana  are  in dire straits.  There  are  some 
insurances,  such as  the  EEC's  Stabex  and  the  IMF's 
compensatory  financing  facility,  but  they do  not cover all 
the  risks.  It is difficult,  impossible even,  to programme 
growth  and  economic  development  in conditions of this kind. 
And  it is also difficult to find  creditors willing  to cover 
such  risks. 
One  of  the  developing  countries'  main  demands  is to be  able 
to run  their development as  flexibly and as reliably as 
possible. 
They  failed  to organize  their demands  for  many  years,  but 
suddenly asserted  them after the oil crisis in  1973  and  the 
surge  in  raw material prices that  followed. 
The  North-South  Dialogue  was  about  to see  the  light of day. -10-
PART  II 
============================================================= 
COMMODITIES  AT  THE  HEART  OF  THE  NORTH-SOUTH  DIALOGUE 
============================================================= 
============================================================= 
I.  FROM  WAR  TO  DIALOGUE- NORTH-SOUTH  IS  BORN 
============================================================= 
A  war  was all it took ••• 
The  war  between  the  Israelis and  the Arabs  in  1973  was  to 
give rise to that astounding  weapon,  oil. 
For  the  first time  in  its history,  the  industrialized west 
was  going  to lose its absolute control over  the world 
economy.  The  peaceful  car-less Sundays  of late 1973 
convinced  the  Europeans  that nothing would  ever be  the  same 
again.  Account  now had  to  be  taken of  the  countries of  the 
Third World,  which  burst upon  the  international  political 
scene  in  the  person of  the oil producers. 
To  all these  countries,  which  had  never  had  any  choice but to 
comply with  the  interests of  the western world,  the 
oil-producers'  act of daring was  an  example.  In  the  space of 
a  few weeks,  a  group of  countries, all of  them  from  the Third 
world,  had  managed  to succeed  where  years of negotiations had 
failed.  The  developing  countries were  quick  to realize  the 
link between oil,  raw materials and  development.  They 
knocked at the  door of  the  industrialized west  harder than 
they had ever done  before,  asking  for  a  settlement and 
generating  a  vast movement  to reform  the  way  the world 
economy  operated. -II-
After handling  the most  urgent issues,  the  industrialized 
countries gradually awakened  to the  fact that their efforts 
over  the  previous  20  years  had  failed  to have  the anticipated 
results.  This  awakening,  it is true,  was  partly brought 
about  by  a  fear that the western economies'  supply of raw 
materials was  under  threat.  No  group of  raw materials 
producers  in  the Third world was  in a  position to repeat the 
oil-producers'  coup,  certainly.  There  is nothing  to compare 
with  the world oil market.  "Crude"  is the  strategic raw 
material par exellence,  export supplies are concentated  in 
the Third World  and  there  is no  short-term substitute  •••  But 
the  industrialized nations could still not rule out the 
possibility of anarchic action by other raw material 
producers  who  might  be quick to capitalize on  tension that 
occurred  on  a  particular market by provisionally reducing 
deliveries,  for example,  or announcing major price rises, as 
Morocco did  for phosphates.  Although  raw material  supplies 
to the  industrialized nations could  not  be  totally 
compromised,  it was  impossible  to rule out certain setbacks. 
The  surge  in  raw material prices  in  1973/74 also served to 
strengthen  the  industrialized nations'  fears. 
For  several months,  the  developed  and  the  industrialized 
countries talked but got nowhere.  The  extraordinary assembly 
of  the  UN  (April  1974)  on  raw materials and  development was 
the  scene of  lively disputes.  The  declaration on  the  new 
international economic  order was  adopted  in the most total 
confusion.  Many  industrialized countries,  including  the  USA, 
Germany  and  Japan,  voted against a  text now  considered to be 
the  economic  creed of the  developing  countries. 
It is true  that the declaration contained  a  vigorous 
denunciation of  the privileges of  the  industrialized 
countries.  The  new  international economic order was  being 
called for  by  a  group of nations which  felt that they  had -12-
been  over-exploited.  The  declaration made  a  number of 
demands  on  which  the  west  was  going  to have  reservations  -
the  right to nationalize  and  have  permanent  sovereignty over 
natural  resources,  an  automatic  link between  the  developing 
countries'  export prices and  their  import prices,  raw 
material  producers'  associations,  elimination of  the 
developing  countries'  long-standing  trade deficit, 
limitation of competition  from  synthetic products,  cheaper 
access  to western  technology and  control over  the activity of 
the multinationals. 
So  in April  1974,  the  climate of relations  between  the  rich 
coutries and  the  poor ones  was  not always  good.  And  there 
were  other misunderstandings  and  other skirmishes  - in  Rome 
(November  1974)  at the  UN  conference  on  food,  in Dakar 
(February  1975)  at  the  non-aligned ministers'  meeting  on  raw 
materials,  in  Lima  (March  1975)  at the  UNIDO  conference  on 
Third  World  industrialization and  in Paris  (April  1975), 
when  the  preparatory conference  for  the North-South  Dialogue 
failed.  The  international  community  gradually moved  towards 
total deadlock.  Yet,  although  the  seeds of confrontation did 
not  completely disappear,  reason  won  through  in  the  end. 
Reason  first  came  from  the  EEC.  The  conclusion of 
negotiations  between  the  Nine  and  46  countries of Africa, 
the  Caribbean  and  the Pacific,  some  of  the  poorest  in  the 
world,  was  hailed as  a  success  for  development cooperation 
policy in both Europe  and  the  Third  World.  The  Lome 
Convention,  signed  in  February 1975,  was  a  milestone  in 
North-South relations.  Its regional solutions  (they were 
negotiated,  not  imposed)  were  of  universal  value  - take  the 
multilateralization of  financial  aid,  the establishment of 
industrial cooperation  and  the guaranteed outlets for  sugar 
producers,  not  to mention  Stabex,  the original export 
earnings stabilization system.  But  Lome  was  not enough  to 
defreeze  relations  between  the  industrialized and  the  poor 
countries.  Much  in  fact depended  on  what attitude the -13-
Americans,  who  had  not so far  been keen on dialogue,  adopted. 
Washington  diplomacy finally changed direction and,  in the 
space of  a  fortnight,  Henry Kissinger,  the  American 
Secretary of State,  made  two  key  speeches  - one  in Kansas 
City on  13  May  1975  and  one  to  the  OECD  Council  in Paris on 
28  May.  Certainly,  Mr  Kissinger made  no  major concessions to 
the Third  World  demands.  As  he  saw it, the  current economic 
system,  which  had  enabled  record  growth  to be  achieved,  had 
to be  preserved.  Freedom  (of  trade,  capital transfer, 
technology and  so on)  was  the basis of  the prosperity of the 
innustrialized world  and  the  developing countries could not 
hope  to prosper without it  ••• 
The  USA,  without which  "no solution was  possible",  neverthe-
less agreed  to certain changes  in the  system to facilitate 
growth  in  the  Third  World.  In  another  speech  on 
development,  this time  to  the extraordinary assembly of the 
UN  in September 1975,  Mr  Kissinger  indeed  said exactly what 
he  thought.  The  anticipated changes should  make  it possible 
to meet  three of  the  challenges  facing  the world  economy  -
those of energy,  raw materials,  and  food • 
• 
The  Community  as  mediator 
The  change  in  the American attitude fell far short of the 
Third World's expectations,  at least when  it came  to the 
terms of  the  new  international economic order,  but it did 
open  the  way  for  a  dialogue.  It is true  that the  Third 
World's  economic  and  financial  situation had  deteriorated 
considerably since  the oil crisis, as  they were  more  affected 
than the  industrialized countries by  the  rising cost of 
crude.  They  went  through  a  serious food  crisis.  They 
benefited less  from  the  raw material price surge of 1973/75 
than did  the  rich countries.  Whether  from  necessity or 
reason,  it was  time  for dialogue.  This is why  the  UN 
extraordinary assembly  in New  York on  1-15 September  1975 -14-
was  a  relative success.  The  compromise  resolution adopted  in 
New  York  was  a  proof  that both  camps  wanted  to find mutually 
acceptable  solutions.  The  Community,  which  probably kept 
more  in  the  background  than  the  USA  at the  plenary session, 
made  a  decisive contribution to drafting  the  compromise  in 
the  sidelines.  The  Nine,  which  had  coordinated  their 
position,  on  the  basis of  a  communication  from  the  European 
Commission,  before  the  assembly,  maintained  unity  throughout, 
representing  a  force  of conciliation and  mediation between 
the  USA  and  the Third world. 
============================================================= 
II.  HOPES  AT  NAIROBI  - THE  INTEGRATED  PROGRAMME  FOR 
COMMODITIES 
============================================================= 
The  UN  resolution of September  1975  was  thought  to open  the 
way  for  a  real dialogue  on  a  reform of  international economic 
relations.  The  compromize  recognized all the aspirations of 
the Third World  countries  - without,  however,  accepting 
implementation of  the  techniques  they suggested  in certain 
fields. 
But all the participants had  accepted  the  text and  this was 
the essential  thing.  This dialogue,  which  many  people  now 
write  "dialogue"  to  show  that it has often been  a  battle of 
strength,  was  held  in  two  main  fields. -15-
First of all,  an  attempt was  made  to find  a  calmer  framework 
than  the  UN  bodies  and one  that would  in any  case  be  more 
conducive  to reflexion,  discussion and practical 
decision-making.  Thus  the  Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation  (CIEC),  to  be  the  symbol  of the 
North-South  Dialogue,  was  organized  in Paris  in  December 
1975. 
This  forum,  it was  felt,  would  be  a  more  suitable one  for 
industrialized and  developing  countries to discuss  the  new 
international economic order.  Many  industrial countries 
found  UNCTAD  debates  too political to lead  to practical, 
viable solutions.  This  in particular, was  the position of 
the  USA. 
The  developing  countries,  for their part,  refused  to hold  the 
dialogue  in the  GATT,  a  body  which  they felt was  almost 
exclusively for  the  USA,  the  EEC  and Japan  and  which  had  made 
possible the  free  trade  that they were  denouncing. 
As  well  as this relative neutrality,  the  CIEC  should have 
gained  in efficiency from  the  restricted number  and 
representativity of its 27  participants.  Four  committees  -
on energy,  raw materials,  development  and  financial  and 
monetary questions  - were  set up. 
The  CIEC  was  a  failure.  We  shall see  some  of  the  reasons 
for  this later, but things could probably not have  been 
otherwise  and,  since  the  fruitless  Cancun  conference of 
summer  1981,  the  CIEC  has  lain dormant. 
But  is the North-South  Dialogue  really dead?  Certainly not, 
because  we  still have  the  traditional  framework  for 
discussion,  UNCTAD. -16-
The  first practical result  - the  Integrated Programme  for 
Commodities 
Of  the  three  UNCTAD  conferences held  since  1975,  it was  the 
Nairobi  one  (May  1976)  that went  furthest  towards  realizing 
the  hopes  the  developing  countries  had  placed  in the  new 
international  economic  order. 
Participants at the  Nairobi  conference were  in fact to adopt, 
via resolution  93  (IV),  the  Integrated Programme  for  Commodi-
ties previously presented  by the  UNCTAD  Secretariat in 
February 1975. 
The  Integrated  Programme  covers  18  commodities  - bananas, 
bauxite,  tropical wood,  cocoa,  coffee,  natural rubber,  cotton 
and  cotton yarn,  copper,  tin,  hard  fibres  and  their products, 
vegetable oil  (including olive oil)  and  oilseeds,  jute and 
jute products,  manganese,  iron ore,  phosphates,  sugar,  tea 
and  meat  - all exports of  considerable  interest to the 
developing  countries. 
The  aims  are  to  : 
keep  commodity prices at levels which,  in real  terms,  are 
remunerative  and  fair to  the  producers  and  fair to the 
consumersl 
- attenuate any excessive  fluctuation of commodity prices and 
stabilize supplies,  in the  interests of both the producers 
and  the  consumersl 
- stabilize and  increase  the  purchasing  power  of each 
developing  country's  export earningsl 
- boost  the  developing countries'  exports of primary and 
processed products  (access  to markets  in the developed 
countries)  and  make  natural products more  competitive  in 
relation to synthetic substitutes; -17-
- increase  the  processing  of  primary products  in the 
developing  countries; 
- increase developing  country  involvement  in  the  transport, 
marketing  and distribution of  their commodity exports; 
- encourage  R  & D of problems related to natural products; 
- improve  market structures for  commodities  which are 
important exports  for  the  developing countries. 
The  Integrated Programe  proposes achieving  these  aims  in  the 
commodity sector by  a  series of  international measures  that 
can  be  applied  singly or together,  bearing  in mind  the 
"characteristics and  problems of each product and  the special 
needs  of  the developing  countries".  These  involve  : 
- setting  up  international buffer stocks; 
- harmonizing  storage policies and  setting up  coordinated 
national  stocks; 
- instituting price arrangements,  particularly negotiated 
price scales that are discussed and adjusted periodically; 
- adopting  international supply regulation measures, 
including export quotas  and  production policies and,  where 
necessary,  long-term multilateral supply and  purchase 
commitments; 
- improving  procedures  for  information and  consultation on 
the  market situation; 
- improving  and  extending  compensatory financing  facilities; 
- improving  market access  for  the  developing  countries' 
primary and  processed products via multilateral commercial -18-
measures,  the extension of  the generalized  system of 
preferences and  trade  promotion measures; 
- taking  international measures  to ensure  the  rapid 
development of raw material processing  in  the  developing 
countries; 
- taking  international measures  to increase  the developing 
countries'  involvement  in  the  transport,  marketing  and 
distribution of their  commodities; 
- taking  measures  to encourage  R  & D of commodity-related 
problems; 
- taking  measures  to encourage  R  & D of problems  related  to 
any natural  products  subject to competition  from 
synthetics; 
- examining  stabilization measures  for products that cannot 
be  stored. 
Resolution  93(IV)  also provided  for  a  negotiating conference 
on  a  common  fund  to finance  the  various  measures of the 
Integrated  Programme  and  preparatory meetings  for 
international negotiations on  the  relevant commodities  to be 
called.  Negotiating  conferences  on  commodities  were  also 
scheduled  to  take  place once  these meetings were  completed. -19-
The  European  Community  signs  the  Common  Fund 
One  of  the essential aims of  the  Integrated  Programme  for 
Commodities  is to stabilize the markets.  In  most cases, 
this should  involve  concluding  international product 
agreements,  many  of which are mainly concerned with setting 
up  buffer stocks.  This  brings  us  to the problem of  financing 
these  stocks  - and  this is where  the  Common  Fund  comes  in. 
It took  two  years of negotiation to reach  the  March  1979 
agreement on  the  basic elements of  the  Common  Fund.  It took 
more  than  a  year for  negotiators to settle certain technical 
and  statutory problems and  reach their final  agreement and, 
on  28  June  1980,  101  countries  (there were  109  of  them  by 
1984)  initialled the act setting  up  the  Common  Fund. 
Two  "windows",  or accounts of  roughly the  same  size, are to 
be  opened. 
The  first is to contribute  to the  financing  of  international 
buffer stocks  (  the  arrangements  for this to be  fixed  later) 
and of national  stocks  that would  be  coordinated at interna-
tional  level  by virtue of  international  commodity agreements. 
The  second  is to finance  measures  other  than stock constitu-
tion - R&D,  productivity increases and  trade promotion. 
The  financial  resources of  the  Fund  are to come  from direct 
contributions  from governments,  resources accruing  from  the 
association of  international  commodity  agreements with  the 
activities of  the  Fund,  loans,  voluntary contributions and 
the  net earnings of  the  Fund  itself. 
Direct government  contributions to the first window  are  to 
amount  to $ 400  million,  of which $ 150  million to be 
deposited  in cash,  $ 150  million made  available and $ 100 
million callable.  Part of  the  contributions are to be paid 
to the  second window  so that this  has at least $  70  million. -W-
The  aim  for  the  second  window  is to reach  a  total of $  350 
million and  the difference between  this amount  and  the direct 
contribution of$ 70  million  (i.e.  $  280  million)  is to  come 
from  voluntary contributions  from  member  countries of the 
Fund. 
The  international product agreements which will  be  associated 
with  the  Fund  are  to deposit  in it 33.3  % of their maximum 
financial  requirements  to obtain credit for  the other two 
thirds. 
The  basic  idea  behind  the  Common  Fund  is that all the 
commodity markets are  not depressed at the  same  time  and  that 
prices that go  up will  compensate  for others going  down.  So, 
if the  Common  Fund  is to function properly,  the  maximum 
number  of  international agreements  must  be  concluded  in 
association with it and  there must  be  real  risk-sharing. 
Some  people,  remembering  that,  in 1973-74,  practically all raw 
material prices  reached  record  levels about  the  same  time,  and 
afterwards  slumped  more  or less together,  have  their doubts 
about  the  truth of this assumption. 
That perhaps explains  the reluctance of  some  countries,  and 
of  the  USA  in particular,  to ratify an  agreement which  was 
still not operational at the  beginning of 1984.  The 
agreement has  in fact  to  be ratified by  90  countries and  they 
have  to  represent  60  % of  the capital.  This  means  that 
practically all the big  industrialized countries  must  sign. 
By  31  March  1984,  there  were  72  ratifications,  representing 
44  % of the capital.  Five of  the  Member  States of the 
Community  had  ratified by  this date  and  the ratification 
process was  under  way  in  the other five countries. 
But  until  the  USA  makes  up  its mind  to ratify it, the  future 
of the  Common  Fund  will  remain  uncertain. -21-
============================================================= 
III.  STABLE  MARKETS  FOR  CONTROLLED  DEVELOPMENT  - A  SIMPLE 
TECHNICAL  PROBLEM 
============================================================= 
The  international commodity markets are suffering  from  too 
much  instability.  This  is nothing  new,  as we  have  seen,  the 
Havana  Charter  talked about it in 1947. 
Supplies  that vary with  the conditions of production or the 
climate - demand  that fluctuates according  to stocks,  the 
health of  the world  economy,  speculation - ill-adjustment of 
supply and  demand.  These  are  just some of the  many  reasons 
for  this instability. 
What  are the  answers? 
Prices first and  foremost  - or  how  to get  them under  control 
Prices,  undeniably,  are at the heart of the discussions on 
raw materials.  Proof of this is the  simple  fact that these 
discussions only really got off  the ground after prices soared 
in 1973-74.  There  are  two  aspects to the price problem 
1.  Chronic price instability (of varying degrees,  according 
to the market)  is deplored  by developed  and developing 
countries alike.  It prevents  the  developing  countries, 
whose  economies  largely depend  on  the  (export and  budget) 
revenue  derived  from  raw materials,  from programming  their 
development as  they would  like.  In  a  way,  price 
variations prevent  them  from  fixing  their economic 
targets.  The  developed  countries which  import their 
products are also afraid of exaggerated price variations, 
but  for different reasons.  What  they  fear  is the  inflation 
that sets  in after a  price rise.  Lastly, -n-
unstable prices are  a  major drawback  to both developed  and 
developing  countries  in  that  they interfere with  the 
programming  of  investments  in  the  raw materials 
exploitation sector.  This  leads  to supply and  demand 
getting out of line,  which  in  turn never  fails to produce 
untimely price  fluctuation. 
2.  The  absolute  level of prices leads,  as one  might  expect, 
the  Third  World  and  the  developed  countries to assess  the 
situation differently.  For  a  long  time,  the Third World 
complained  that its export products were  not  remunerative 
enough.  But  the developed countries  - which,  let us  not 
forget,  account  for  a  large part of the world  import  trade 
- tend  to want  cheap supplies.  The  two  groups  have  to 
compromise  and  agree  on  prices that are fair  to  the 
consumer  and  remunerative  to  the  producer.  Alongside  this 
essential question of prices,  the  product agreements  have 
a  second  important purpose,  namely to ensure guaranteed 
supplies  for  the  signatory consumer  countries. 
There  is indeed  a  whole  series of methods  for controlling the 
markets  in  such  a  way  as  to eliminate excessive price 
fluctuation  and  define  a  level  that is desirable  to both 
consumer  and  producer. 
different techniques. 
Product  agreements  can  use  quite 
It is reasonable  to start talking 
about  a  product agreement  once  there  is consultation 
(regardless of  form  or degree of constraint)  between  consumer 
and  producer.  The  following  are  the  main  methods  that can  be 
used  to stabilize raw material markets  : 
- Exchanges  of  information  :  the  minimum  requirement. 
Representatives of  the  producers  and  the  consumers  meet 
regularly to discuss  their most  recent  information on  the 
prospects of greater supply and  demand.  There  is, properly 
speaking,  no  constraint here,  but  the meetings  can at least 
help to restrict any setbacks. -D-
Action  to encourage  demand  :  the main  idea here is to 
facilitate  a  product's access  to the  consumer market. 
Sales  taxes which  sometimes over-inflate retail prices and 
discourage  buyers  can  be  reduced  or even  abolished.  Trade 
promotion  schemes  can also be envisaged. 
- Price observance  :  producers  and  consumers  define a  minimum 
export price target,  which  can  be  revised later if it 
proves,  unrealistics.  A price range  can also be  chosen 
instead of  a  simple minimum  price.  In  all cases,  such 
prices are purely indicative in  that there are no  provi-
sions for a  system of  intervention to ensure compliance. 
- Long-term contracts  :  A long  term contract is a  reciprocal 
commitment  by producer and  consumer.  The  producer agrees 
to deliver certain quantities and  the  consumer agrees  to 
buy  them.  This  type of contract can also contain a  price 
clause.  It can  be bilateral  (between  two  States),  regional 
(between  two  groups of countries)  or multilateral  (between 
the majority of  producers  and  consumers).  There  may  be 
difficulties attached  to concluding  such  a  contract,  as it 
is hard  to predict supply and  demand,  particularly in the 
case of agricultural products.  The governments,particu-
larly in  the west  where private firms  have  an  important 
part to play,  are not always  able  to respect their 
commitments  fully. 
- Expart  quotas  :  The  principle here  is for  the  producing 
countries  to define export quotas,  the size of which will 
vary according  to  the  trend  in  the price of the  product  in 
question.  If prices rise,  then  the quotas,  which are 
usually defined  for each country individually, are 
gradually expanded  or even done  away  with altogether.  If a 
complete  slump is feared,  then  there may  be  an  embargo. 
This  resolute action on  supply means  that prices can  be 
maintained  within  a  bracket.  It is not necessarily to the -N-
advantage of  the exporters,  which  have  to shoulder all the 
economic  and  social costs of  the operation if prices drop; 
- Storage policy  :  the constitution of  stocks  is no doubt  the 
best way  of  stabilizing  the  markets.  It an also be  very 
costly - either because  the  product  is expensive  (as with 
copper)  or because it is difficult to keep  beyond  a  certain 
period  (as with coffee,  cocoa etc).  Stocks  mean  that a  price 
bracket can  be  maintained.  When  prices rise, stocks are drawn 
on,  and  when  prices drop,  they are built up.  Stocks  can  be 
managed  on  a  national or  an  international basis,  although the 
latter formula  offers more  guarantees.  It is  important  to 
choose  a  price  level that is near  long-term balance  (which 
can  be  difficult to define).  Target prices that are  too high 
soon  lead  to  the  liquidation of stocks,  while prices that are 
too  low  lead  to excessive  stock-piling  - unless it is agreed 
that prices  can  temporarily  come  out of  the  bracket and  un-
less  the  storage policy coupled with  an export quota  system. 
Stocks  would  not  normally be  expected  to be  less than  the 
quantities required  to provide  the  members  of  the  agreement 
with  three months'  supplies.  Buffer stocks,  logically 
speaking,  are  aimed at defending  prices,  although  a  more 
flexible  formula  could well  be  devized.  For example, 
economic  contingency stocks,  smaller  in quantity than  the 
buffer stocks,  could  help to even out the price curve  and  the 
idea would  be  to eliminate exaggerated differences  in prices 
rather  than  defend  a  pre-established level.  Lastly,  a 
by-product agreement creating buffer stocks  and  a  price 
bracket could  be  completed  by provisions  to offer the 
consumer  guaranteed  supplies.  So  reserve stocks  could  be  set 
up  alongside  the buffer stocks,  with  a  view  to palliating any 
serious  inadequacy  in  supply.  There  could  also be  a  clause 
forcing  the exporters to deliver  to signatories of  the 
agreement  as  a  matter of priority.  In  case  of  temporary 
shortage,  export quotas,  paid at the  ceiling price of the 
agreement or even slightly higher,  could  be  fixed. -~-
- Financial machinery  :  there could  be  export or import 
duties  that could  be  used  for various purposes  - to finance 
buffer stocks,  product marketing measures,  diversification 
schemes  and  so on. 
Techniques exist then.  They  have  been  listed and  they are 
known.  So  why not  use  them  and  solve  the  problem of 
commodities  ? 
There  are  three main  reasons  why it is not so easy to  move 
from  theory to practice.  The  first,  and  doubtless  the most 
important,  is the financial  cost of agreements.  As  we  know, 
the most efficient way of stabilizing certain markets is to 
set  up  buffer stocks,  but  this is a  very expensive  business 
and  the  producers  and  consumers do  not always  agree as  to  the 
advisibility of  running  large  financial  risks. 
And  when  there  is also  a  question of laying down  a  set of 
export restrictions,  certain industrialized countries are 
very reluctant about  what  they consider  to be  an  impediment 
to  the  proper working of the  market. 
Lastly,  there are political and  strategic factors.  These  can 
create  upheaval  on  certain commodity markets  and 
substantially reduce  the effectivess of international 
agreements. 
Too  few  international agreements 
Since  the  Integrated  Programme  was  adopted  in Nairobi,  a 
certain number of agreements  have  emerged  or been 
renegotiated within  the  framework of the  new  agreements. 
They will  therefore benefit from  the  provisions of  the  Common 
Fund  once it comes  into effect. 
Some  of  them  provide  for buffer stocks, with  a  view  to 
defending  a  price level  (rubber,  tin and  cocoa).  In  other -~-
cases  (jute and  tropical wood,  for  example)  only measures 
having  no direct effect on prices  have  been  introduced. 
Lastly,  the  coffee  agreement,  which contains  a  system of 
export quotas,  is not negotiated  in  UNCTAD. 
- Rubber  :  The  agreement  on natural rubber was  signed at the 
end  of  1979  and  is due  to expire at the  end of  1985.  It is 
currently the only one  that works  with adequate 
effectiveness and  has  no  debts. 
It involves  a  buffer stock financed half by  the  producing 
countries and half  by  the  consumers.  The  idea  is to 
maintain prices  in  a  bracket  (which itself contains  a 
semi-automatic price revision mechanism).  This  means  that 
if the  long-term tendency on  the market  is upwards or 
downwards,  the price bracket must  be  adjusted to reflect 
it. 
This  agreement has  managed  to counter-balance all the 
negative effects of the  recession and  to stabilize prices 
as  from  1981. 
- Tin  :  The  6th tin agreement was  also negotiated  under  the 
Integrated Programme.  The  buffer stocks are  financed  half 
by  the  producers  and  half by  the  consumers.  This  agreement 
came  into force  in July  1982  for  a  five-year period.  The 
international tin market  in  1984  is characterized  by  very 
large stocks strongly affecting the  level of prices.  A 
"mysterious operator",  in reality the  government of  one  of 
the  producers  belonging  to the  agreement,  speculated and 
brought about a  huge  drop in prices between  February and 
June  1982  and  the  situation was  made  worse  by  large-scale 
fraud. 
So,  two  years after the  agreement  came  into force,  the 
members  are  faced with the  problem of stock financing. -27-
- Cocoa  :  The  third cocoa  agreement,  due  to expire on  30 
September 1984,  is faced  with  a  fairly similar situation. 
The  stock  intended  to keep prices within  a  bracket is no 
longer operational.  Faced  with  a  price drop and  the 
prospect of  intervention buying that ought  to have 
followed,  the  members  of  the  agreement preferred  to  suspend 
stock management operations.  So  the  stock has virtually 
never  functioned.  Furthermore,  the  USA,  still the biggest 
consumer,  and  Ivory Coast,  the  leading producer since 
Ghanaian  production collapsed,  are not members  of  the 
agreement. 
A  new  conference  was  due  to begin  in Geneva  in May  1984  to 
negotiate  a  further agreement.  The  Community  was  to try 
and  persuade  Ivory Coast  to join an  arrangement  that might 
include  a  system of export quotas. 
The  cocoa  agreement  reflects  the spirit of Nairobi,  i.e. it 
tends  to provide  high price brackets so as to ensure  that 
the  exporting countries'  earnings  rise.  This  idea,  which 
is satisfactory from  an  ethical point of view,  does  not 
always fit in with basic market  trends and  the  buffer 
stocks do  not  have  the  financial  means  of defending price 
levels that are  too artificial.  The  trend  that currently 
seems  to  be  emerging,  as  the  rubber agreement illustrates, 
is towards  semi-automatic price bracket revision machinery 
geared  to  the  long-term situation on  the market. 
- Coffee  :  This  product  is the  most  important export, after 
oil,  for  the  economies of the  developing countries. 
There  has  been  a  coffee  agreement  for  20  years.  It 
involves stabilizing prices  through export quotas,  with  no 
buffer stock.  The  USA,  setting aside  its principles for 
political and  strategic reasons,  is a  party to this 
agreement,  the principal producing  members  of which  are  the -~-
countries of  Latin America,  particularly Brazil and 
Columbia.  Washington  in  fact  fears  that the  economies of 
these countries may  slump. 
The  other major  producing  members  are  the African countries 
of  OAMCAF. 
The  coffee  agreement,  unlike  the other product agreements, 
is negotiated  in  London. 
The  eastern bloc countries do not belong  to  the  agreement  -
which  has  led  to  the  emergence of  a  double market with 
prices  that are half  the official ones.  This obviously 
amounts  to partial failure. 
- Jute  and  tropical  wood  :  These  two  products are  now  the 
subject of  agreements.  One  of  them  (jute)  has  come  into 
force  on  a  provisional basis and  the other  is open  for 
signing  and  ratification. 
These  agreements  have  been  concluded  within  the  framework 
of the  Integrated Programme,  but they do  not contain any 
price stabilization machinery.  Only  R  & D  schemes,  export 
promotion  and  other attendant measures  are  covered.  They 
are  therefore eligible for  the  second  window of  the  Common 
Fund. 
The  terms  of  trade  - the  spectre  of  indexation 
Raw  material prices are  the experts'  nightmare  and,  in spite 
of what  has  sometimes  been  highly sophisticated  investiga-
tion,  it has  been practically impossible  to detect any  long-
term  trend  since  the  beginning of  the  century.  Prices evolve 
so chaotically that no-one  can  say with  any certainty what 
they are going  to be.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  the price of  raw 
materials is,  in  a  way,  what  is really at stake  in  the 
North-South Dialogue. -~-
It is impossible  to talk about  the  trend  in  raw material 
prices without mentioning  the discussion on  the  terms of 
trade.  In  technical  language,  the  terms of trade are  the 
relationship between  the price of exports  and  the price of 
imports. 
A government's  aim  is to find  out whether  this relationship 
is developing  favourably or not varying at all.  If  this is 
the  case,  then  its purchasing power will  have  increased or 
been maintained.  If  the  relationship is deteriorating,  then 
it will  have  to sell larger quantities of its products  to 
maintain  its purchasing power.  This will  mean  a 
deterioration in  the  terms of  trade. 
For  many  years,  the developing  countries have maintained  that 
the  industrial products  they  import  from  the developed 
countries are  increasing more  than  the  raw materials that 
they sell and  that their purchasing power  is waning 
accordingly. 
Some  people  contest  this.  Inadequate statistics and  methods 
of calculation mean  that it can often be difficult to measure 
the  advantages  to one or other of the  camps  from  trends  in 
raw material prices and  different studies which  the  UN,  the 
World  Bank  and  UNCTAD  have  commissioned  from  experts have not 
always  come  to similar conclusions.  It is in any case 
impossible  to generalize  a  trend.  Conclusions may  be  very 
different from  one  export  produc~  one  country and  one 
period  to another.  However,  it does  appear that the high 
growth  in  the  industrialized countries  recorded over the 
decades  has  been  largely to  the detriment of the developing 
countries that produce  raw materials. -~-
Rather  than embark  upon  a  debate  that leads  nowhere,  it is 
more  interesting  to find  out  how  the  terms of  trade between 
North  and  South should  evolve  from  now  on  and  how  we  can 
manage  to maintain direction.  The  Third World  began  the 
indexation battle,  with  a  view  to preserving  their purchasing 
power  in  comparison with the  industrialized countries,  back 
in 1974.  They  considered  this to  be  the  absolute  expression 
of  the  ideas of  the  new  international economic  order as 
applied  to  the  trade  in  raw materials.  Its role was  to 
ensure that,  from  one  year  to another,  they could obtain an 
identical quantity of goods  with  the  earnings accruing  from 
selling a  sack of  coffee or a  crate of bananas. 
The  technique  of  indexation  is no doubt  the  one  most 
disputed  by  a  large  number  of  the countries of the  west. 
They  look  upon  it as an  infernal machine  which  causes 
inflation,  leading  the  whole world  economy  almost to 
disintegration.  At  a  time  when  the  industrialized countries 
are  fighting  an  all-out battle against  inflation and  when 
certain of  them  have  abandoned  indexation of  the wages  of 
their own  nationals,  it is easy  to understand  that the debate 
on  this subject should  have  been  shelved,  in spite of  the 
fact  that the basic problem  is still there. -31-
PART  III 
===================================================e========= 
THE  COMMUNITY  AND  COMMODITIES  IN  THE  LOME  CONVENTION 
==========================================e================== 
Defence of prices,  indexation,  fabourable  trends  in  the terms 
of trade  - all aspects of a  debate  aimed  at ensuring that  the 
developing  countries can  defend,  if not  improve,  their export 
earnings and  thus  programme  the orderly development  of their 
economies. 
A world-wide  dialogue is going  on  and  the  new  international 
economic order is under  way.  Be  it cause or consequence,  the 
world  economic  crisis has  prevented satisfactory 
implementation of all the  aspects Of  the  Integrated Programme 
for Commodities.  And,  as  we  have  seen,  the  one or  two 
product agreements  concluded  over the  past  few years  do  not 
really amount  to a  convincing result,  particularly since,  for 
many  of the  poorest Third  World  countries,  which  export one 
or few  commodities,  a  drop  in  the  price of these products is 
a  permanent threat to their very existence. 
So,  in  this context,  the full meaning of what  the  Community 
has  done  to  remedy  this state of affairs becomes  clear. 
As  soon  as it was  introduced  in 1975,  at the  centre of the 
debate  on  the  new  international  economic order,  the  system  to 
stabilize the  commodity export earnings of the  EEC's  partners 
in  the  Lome  Convention was  hailed as an  exemplary contribu-
tion  to solving  the  problem of  raw materials.  This  system, 
now  known  as  Stabex,  covers agricultural exports  from  the 
Third  World  and  benefits more  than  60  of its countries.  That 
is to  say that,  in spite of its regional nature, it concerns 
a  large number of the developing  countries  involved -32-
in the North-South Dialogue,  including  the majority of the 
least developed countries. 
The  Lome  Convention also contains  a  system to guarantee  the 
purchase,  at fixed prices,  of  sugar produced  by  the member 
countries - which  is far  from  being  negligeable  in  the  case 
of  a  product that is so vital to  some  of  them. 
Lastly,  in  1980,  Lome  II  introduced  a  system known  as 
Sysmin,  aimed at helping  mineral  exporting  countries to 
palliate any accidental drops  in production that adversely 
affected their export earnings. 
============================================================= 
I.  STABEX- A  COMMUNITY  INITIATIVE  IN  TEMPORE  NON  SUSPECTO 
============================================================= 
In  the  spring of  1973,  important negotiations between  the 
Community  and  the  Third world were  being  prepared,  as talks 
on extending  the  convention of association between  the  EEC 
and  the States of Africa and  Madagascar,  the  Yaounde 
Convention,  were  due  to start in August  of  that year.  The 
Convention  had  been  expanded  to  include  those  countries 
linked,  in  the  Commonwealth,  to the  United  Kingdom  - which 
had  joined  the  European  club on  1  January  1973  - so  now  a 
total of  more  than  40  developing  countries were  involved. 
In  early 1973,  the  European  Commission brought out  a 
memorandum  which  consituted its credo for  the  forthcoming 
convention of association. 
A  new  chapter appeared  in  the  Community's  cooperation policy, 
dealing with the stabilization of  export earnings.  It said, -33-
in particular,  that financial aid alone  was  not  enough  to 
generate an  adequate  rate of growth  in  the  Third World.  The 
reasons for  this were  known.  They  included  the  fact  that aid 
was  only effective if applied  to economies  showing  a  minimum 
of stability.  It also only had  an effect on economic  growth 
in  the  medium  and  the  long  term,  although  this growth  could 
well  be  stimulated  in  the  short  term by increasing and 
regularizing export earnings. 
Then  followed  an  analysis of  the  international community's 
ability to act along  these  lines.  The  memorandum  said that 
the  problem of stabilizing export earnings  in  the  countries 
which  produced  commodities  seemed  to call for solutions on  an 
international scale.  The  international agreements  on products 
concerning  the  developing countries  (coffee,  tin,  sugar and 
wheat)  had  not,  however,  worked  very satisfactorily so far. 
First of all,  few products  had  become  the  subject of inter-
national agreements,  in particular because  the  consumer 
countries were  not  unanimously  in  favour of this formula.  And 
there were difficulties when  it came  to  the operation of the 
agreements  and  the  fact  that their aims  were,  essentially, 
only to stabilize prices. 
So  the  memorandum  said,  it would  be  wrong  to count on 
concluding  international agreements  alone.  The  prevailing 
approach  in this field,  together with  the  limitations of 
existing agreements,  meant  that it was  unlikely that 
agreements of the  kind  that would  provide an overall answer 
to  the problem of stabilizing the developing  countries'  export 
earnings could  be  produced  within a  relatively short  time. 
The  point of these  statements  becomes  very clear  today when 
it is remembered  that  they were  made  before  the oil crisis of 
1973  and  before all the  manoeuvring  on  commodities  that 
followed. -~-
The  point of  the  Community's  action is also very clear. 
No-one  can suspect it of demagogic  considerations aimed at 
guaranteeing  its commodity supplies and  obtaining  the  good 
will of  the  countries of  the  Third World.  Its essential aim 
was  to establish a  system that would provide effective help 
for countries  linked to it by  association agreements. 
But Brussels had  no  intention of placing itself outside the 
natural  framework  of  the  international dialogue.  The 
Community  was  anxious  to seek a  solution in as open  a 
framework  as possible,  said the  memorandum,  and it had  always 
systematically marked its preference  for  international 
agreements.  Here,  its position of principle was  unchanged. 
More  explicitly,  the  European  Commission  said that the 
association machinery  for  the  stabilization of export 
earnings  should  : 
not  interfere with  the  free  working of  the  markets; 
not create barriers to international trade; 
- be  compatible with any world  agreements  that exist for the 
same  products  and  not  impede  the  conclusion of  further 
international agreements. 
So  much  for  the  background.  What  was  the  system to be? 
============================================================= 
II.  STABEX  AND  ITS  MACHINERY 
============================================================= 
The  Commission  formulated  one  main  idea  in its memorandum of 
1973.  On  the  European side,  it was  felt that any  sums  trans-
ferred  to compensate  for  reduced  export earnings ought  to be 
channelled  into the  sector which  had  made  the  loss or was 
destined  to diversify its exports.  The  Commission  thought, -35-
for example,  that Stabex  transfers might well  be  used  to 
boost  the productivity of industrial export crops,  to replace 
them  by food  crops  in certain cases and,  at all events,  to 
help improve  the  balance of trade. 
The  Kingston negotiations decided otherwise.  The  Community 
had  to abandon  this principle,  which it felt to be  a  most 
worthwhile one,  and  left the  ACP  countries completely free  to 
use  the  transfers as  they saw fit.  Emphasizing  this fact is 
already responding  to the criticism levelled at Stabex -
which  is sometimes  accused  of artificially maintaining 
certain export  crops  to  the detriment of  food  crops. 
It is worth noting  that  Lome  II, without  going as  far as 
establishing  the principle of  compulsory allocation to 
particular sectors,  did  force  the  ACP  recipients to explain 
what  they did  with the  transfers.  And  one of the  things  in 
which  EEC  development  commissioner  Edgard  Pisani really 
believes is getting the  ACP  partners  in  the negotiations  for 
renewal  of  the  Lome  Convention  in 1984  to agree  that 
discipline in  the matter of allocation of Stabex transfers is 
absolutely vital.  The  Community  in fact feels - and  here it 
is with  the  general  trend as far as  the guiding principles of 
development aid are  concerned  - that transfers must  be  used 
in a  way  that is part of a  coherent strategy leading to self-
sufficiency in  food  in  the  developing countries. 
In  spite of the  fact  that the principle of compulsory 
allocation was  dropped during  the  course of  the first two 
Conventions, it is reasonable  to suggest that the Stabex 
system,  as set up  in  1975,  has  worked  satisfactorily overall. 
Only minimal  adjustments were  made  in  Lome  II.  we  shall 
analyze  the  advantages  and  the limitations of  the  system 
later. -36-
It should  not  be  forgotten  that Stabex  is only for 
agricultural products,  exports of  which  represent a 
significant percentage of  the external  resources of the 
recipient countries. 
47  products  ••• 
If the  soundness of  an  export earnings support system is to 
be  judged  by  the  trends  in  the  number  of products  covered, 
then Stabex  is  a  clear success.  There were  29  on  the list in 
Lome  I,  44  when  Lome  II was  signed  and  three more  products 
have  been  added  since. 
It is most  important  to remember  that these  47  products 
represent most of  the agricultural commodities  which  the  ACP 
Group  export  (the  figure  is,  in reality,  46,  because  iron ore 
is still covered  by Stabex).  The  two  main  exceptions are 
sugar,  for which  there  is a  special protocol  - we  shall 
discuss  this later - and  tobacco,  for which  no decision has 
yet been  taken. 
In  February 1985,  when  the  next Convention is due  to take 
effect,  iron ore will  join the  other mineral  products  in the 
special mineralssystem. 
Details of  the  products eligible for  Stabex payments are set 
out  in  Annex  1 • 
•••  and  more  than  60  ACP  States 
The  Stabex  system covers  the export of more  than  60  countries 
of Africa,  the  caribbean  and  the Pacific  (ACP)  which are 
members  of  the  Lome  Convention.  This means  that almost half 
the developing  countries  in  the  UN  are  concerned.  They 
include  the majority of  the  least developed  countries  (LDCs) 
on  the  Geneva organization's lists, which,  as  we  shall see, 
benefit from  very  favourable  treatment  under  Stabex. -37-
The  Community's  aim  is to enable all its ACP  partners to 
benefit from  the  possibilities offered by the Stabex  system. 
In  view of both  the vast range  of products  covered  by Stabex 
and  the  sugar protocol,  the  number of potential beneficiaries 
is high  and,  over  the  period 1975-82,  45  ACP  countries 
received  at least one  transfer. 
Financial aspects  - loans  and  grants 
A global  amount  of  550  million  ECU  was  allocated  to  the 
Stabex  system  for  the  five  years of  Lorn~  II.  So  110  million 
ECU  is available,  on  average,  each year. 
Drops  in ACP  export earnings  can  be  compensated  for  by loans 
(that are  repaid  once  earnings rise again)  or by simple 
grants  in  the  case of  the  least developed  countries.  This  is 
where  the  system differs considerably from  the  International 
Monetary  Fund's  compensation  system  (the main  lines of which 
are set out  in  the next part),  which  demands  that all loans 
be  repaid.  A total of  30  ACP  States are  exempt  from 
repayment of  transfers. 
The  Stabex  fund  is divided  into five  annual parts.  Every 
year,  the  amount  available  is therefore one  fifth of the 
whole,  plus  a  possible  20  % substracted  from  the  following 
year's allocation. 
The  risks  insured  :  sickness  and  unemployment 
stabex does  not aim at generating  economic effects of its 
own.  The  idea  is simply to inject into the  relevant ACP 
country an  amount  of money  that would  normally have  come 
from  the  market  had  not deficient production or the  economic 
situation, or a  combination of  the  two,  prevented  this. 
The  commonest  comparison is with  a  conventional  insurance 
policy where  the  payments  in  themselves  have  no effect. So, -38-
over  the period of  Lome  I,  47  % of transfers were  paid over 
as  "unemployment  insurance"  (whereby  the  system protects  the 
ACP  States against loss of earnings due  to  a  poor  economic 
situation)  and  53  % as  "sickness  insurance"  (losses due  to 
local  circumstances). 
The  drop  in export earnings  - compared  to what? 
Statements of variations  in export earnings,  particularly 
downwards,  have  to be  made  with  reference  to something.  In 
the  case of Stabex,  two  things  come  into the calculations  : 
- a  period of  four  years preceding  the  year  in question is 
used  to establish a  country's average export earnings; 
as  to the destination of exports,  the question is to decide 
whether  to base  calculations on  exports  to all destinations 
or just on exports  to  the  EEC.  The  general rule with 
Stabex  is to look at just the exports  to  the  EEC,  although, 
for all of  the  ACP  countries,  which,  because of their 
geographical situation,  do  not have  the  EEC  as  a  natural 
outlet, exports  to all destinations are  taken  into 
consideration. 
Dependence  thresholds  and  trigger mechanisms 
A product is eligible if,  the  previous year,  it represented 
6.5  % of  total export earnings to all destinations  (2  %  in 
the  case  of  the  least-developed,  land-locked  and  island 
countries).  This provision was  devised  to ensure  that the 
system keeps  close  to reality  (in other words,  to prevent a 
complex  system  from  being  used  to cover exports of a  product 
that has  become  of  only minimal  importance)  and  to make  it 
possible  to give  an  advantage  to  the  countries that need it 
the most. 
drop of at 
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developed,  land-locked  and  island countries)  as  compared  to -39-
The  IMF  and  export earnings  - the  compesantory  financing 
facility 
The  IMF  set up  its compensation  scheme  for drops  in export 
earnings  in 1963.  It was  not really operational  in its 
original  form  and  the arrangements  for  implementation were 
considerably liberalized in  1975  and  1979.  Since  these 
reforms, it has been widely used. 
It is combined with  the  IMF's  food  facility. 
The  aim is to provide  financial  compensation  for  IMF  members 
whose  export earnings have  dropped  for reasons outside their 
control. 
The  beneficiaries are,  de  facto,  the developing  countries  and 
developed  countries  "on  the  fringe"  - Iceland  and  New  Zealand 
for  example. 
It differs with  Stabex in that  : 
- it is of the  balance-of-payment-support type; 
- it even  takes account of services if the  recipient country 
wishes it to do  so  and  continues  to do  so  for several years 
after the decision; 
- the  IMF,  with its trigger mechanisms,  compensates  for  a 
trend  in  the  economy,  whereas  Stabex  can compensate  for  a 
structural downward  trend  in exports  the  IMF  in fact takes 
the  net drop  into account  (surpluses on certain products 
make  up  for losses and  the net balance  is taken  into 
consideration)  while  Stabex  compensates  for  losses  incurred 
with one  product,  even  if other products  are  showing  a 
surplus; 
Stabex  transfers are limited  by  the  amount actually 
available,  whereas  the  IMF  transfers are limited  by  the 
member  countries'  quotas.  In  1984,  the  combined  amount of 
the  transfer could  go as high as  83  % of  the quotas.  Such 
transfers are,  of course,  in addition to  the  normal  quotas; 
the  facility does  not take  any Stabex  transfers into 
account; 
the  philosophy behipd  the  IMF  scheme  is a  macro-economic 
one.  It has  no  connexion with  the  commodity  economy,  even 
though  the recipients are  the  developing countries that 
export  these products; 
- the recipient countries have  to have  a  balance of payments 
problem; 
- all transfers have  to be  reimbursed. -~-
the  average earnings  from  exports to the  Community  over  the 
four  previous years. 
Thus  Stabex  is very much  an automatic  system. 
Use  of  transfers 
Lome  I  did  not lay down  any particular rules on  the matter. 
However,  an  article in  the  second  Convention provides for 
transfers  to  be  channelled  into the affected sectors or, with 
a  view  to diversification,  into other productive sectors. 
As  we  have  already emphasized,  when  the  Community  abandoned 
its demand  that its partners should  be  forced  to channel  the 
transfers  into particular sectors, it was  going  against its 
original wishes,  and  it is now  trying  to get its initial idea 
accepted  by  the  ACP  countries  in  the negotiations  for  Lome 
III.  Several decades  of aid  have  shown  that transfers are 
not  always  used effectively and  coherently.  In  view of  the 
financial  problems encountered  by  the donor  countries - and 
the  10  members  of  the  EEC  do  not escape  these  - the latter 
now  expect to  have  some  sort of guarantee  that the  funds  they 
put into helping  the developing  countries are wisely used. 
So  more  stringent discipline  in  the  future  cannot be 
excluded.  This,  in  any  case,  is a  condition which  Brussels 
has  placed  on  increasing its financial  assistance. 
Other  provisions 
A  number  of provisions of less  immediate  scope  should  also  be 
noted  : 
- the possibility of  including  new  products  in the list.  But 
as  the list is already largely representative,  it cannot be 
extended  much  further  (products  covered  by  the  common 
agricultural policy pose  considerable economic  problems and 
problems of principle  to  the  Community  and  are  therefore -41-
virtually impossible  to include).  Sisal and  raw  tobacco 
products are  being discussed; 
the possibility of  the  ACP  States choosing  between  an 
approach  by  individual products or by families of products 
in certain cases; 
the  possibility of Stabex also covering  trade  between  the 
ACP  countries themselves.  However,  certain problems  (above 
all of  a  customs  and  statistical nature)  are  such  that this 
inclusion can only be decided on  a  case-by-case basis after 
thorough  investigation of each dossier; 
a  short reference period whereby  the  system can  intervene 
when  an  ACP  State undertakes  to process  a  product which  has 
traditionally been  exported  unprocessed,  or starts to 
export  a  product of which it is not  a  traditional producer. 
============================================================= 
III.  AFTER  NEARLY  10  YEARS  OF  OPERATION,  THE  OVERALL  RESULTS 
ARE  POSITIVE 
============================================================= 
Stabex was  presented  as  a  major  innovation  in  international 
economic  relations  and  it has  played  the part it was  given  by 
Lome  I  to the  full.  over  the  five years of  Lome  I, it 
enabled  37  ACP  countries  to be  given  388  million  ECU  (119 
transfers)  for losses  incurred  in their exports of 24 
products  to  the  EEC. 
And  it confirmed  the  fact  that most of the  fluctuation  in 
earnings  from  the  products  covered  could  be put  down  to 
variations in  the  volume of exports much  more  than  to price 
changes. -42-
This was  true of  Lome  I.  But at the  beginning of  Lome  II, 
difficulties appeared  and  variations in  the price of  the 
products  became  much  more  important,  to the point where  the 
funds  were  inadequate  and  transfers had  to be  reduced  in  1980 
and  1981.  Since  then,  the  recovery of  some  prices and  lower 
reference years  have  enabled  the situation to return to 
normal. 
After  the euphoria of  the  first five  years of application, 
this was  a  rude  awakening.  And  it showed  - if any 
demonstration was  needed  - that Stabex  remains  a  system with 
effects that are of necessity limited and  that it does not 
rule out  the  need  for  international solutions,  in particular 
to the  problem of price stabilization. 
Nevertheless,  the  Stabex  record  is positive overall, 
regardless of  the  fact  that it does  not  always  go as far  as 
the  ACP  beneficiaries would  like. 
Lome  I  - not all the  reguests  could  be  met 
The  380  million  ECU  which  Lome  I  provided  for  the  five  years 
of application was  enough  to meet all the  justified requests 
for  transfers. 
There  were  32  products  on  the  Stabex list and  transfers were 
made  for  24  of  them.  Details of  this are set out  in Annex  3. 
Almost  40  % of  the  amount  of  the  transfers were  for groundnut 
products,  16  % for  iron ore,  11  % for  cotton and  10  % for 
rough  timber  (a  specific economic  problem of  1975,  when  99  % 
of  the  rough  timber  transfers were  made). 
Five  products  - the  three groundnut products plus  iron ore 
and  cotton - were  behind  two  thirds of  the  transfers.  There -~-
is no  rational explanation for this.  The  causes - local 
circumstances  and  short-term economic  problems  - differ.  At 
most,  one  can  say that it was  the Sahel which  had greatest 
recourse  to Stabex,  particularly for groundnuts  and  cotton, 
with  44  % of the transfers.  Here,  Stabex more  or less played 
the part of exceptional aid  following  the drought  in this 
area of the world.  Local  circumstances,  often of a  natural 
order  (droughts,  hurricanes, plant diseases etc), were  behind 
69  % of the  transfers for loss  of export earnings and  4  % of 
it (14  million ECU)  was  paid out when  mines  in Sierra Leone 
and  Swaziland  closed  down.  In  this case,  the Stabex  sickness 
insurance  even  covered  death ••• 
The  remaining  third,  119  million ECU,  was  paid over  for 
losses  in export earnings  incurred  through  the  economic 
situation in  the  Community.  In  1975,  the products were  rough 
timber,  hides  and  skins,  cotton and  coprah and,  in the 
following years,  sisal,  iron ore  and  sawn  timber were 
included  too. 
Lome  II  - two  difficult first years 
In  1980  and  1981,  the  first two years  of  Lome  II, the Stabex 
system was  not in  a  position to meet all the  justified 
requests  for transfers.  Far  from it. 
In  1980,  total justified requests  exceeded  available Stabex 
funds  (123.1  million ECU)  and it was  only possible to cover 
52.8  % overall. 
There  was  an  even  bigger deficit in 1981.  The  difference 
between  justified requests  and  financial availability was  341 
million  ECU  and  the  theoretical overall rate of coverage was 
only 24.7  %. 
Although  an  extra effort from  the  Community  made  it possible 
to bring  coverage  up  to 42.8  %,  these events  showed  the -M-
fragility of  the  system when  the  economy  of  the  main  products 
covered  is  in difficulties,  and  also  the mechanical  effects 
of  the  method  of  operaton.  This  was  an opportunity to think 
about  what  was  behind  these  problems. 
A  study  by  the  European  Commission  showed  that the  sudden 
slump  in prices was  by  far  the  most  significant factor as  far 
as  the difficulties of  1980  and  1981  were  concerned,  The 
price factor  made  a  decisive  appearance  in  1980  and  increased 
to explosive  proportions during  the  course  of  1981.  It had 
had  practically no  effect during  the  five  years of  Lome  I. 
The  price  factor  came  into play,  above all,  for coffee  and 
cocoa,  because  96  % of all the  requests generated  by  the 
price drop  were  for  these  two  products. 
The  second  major  cause  of  the  wave  of  transfer applications 
was  the  way  the  moveable  averages  worked  - the effects of 
phenomena  that had  occurred well  before,during  the  period of 
the  first Convention,  only became  apparent during  Lome  II. 
The  European  Commission's  study reveals another,  more 
worrying  cause  rooted  in  the  economies  of  a  large  number  of 
ACP  States,  namely  the deterioration of  the  competitive 
position of  the  ACP  countries for  some  of  the  commodities 
covered  by  the  system.  This deterioration can  largely be  put 
down  to  the  inadequate  export  performances of many  of  these 
countries. 
Between  1970  and  1980,  only two  Stabex products,  tea  and 
coffee,  showed  increases  in exports  to  the  EEC.  Cocoa 
stagnated  and  all the  others declined,  some  of  them,  such as 
groundnuts,  groundnut oil and  meal,  hides,  skins and  timber, 
very rapidly. 
In  spite of very favourable  trade  arrangements  on  the  EEC 
market,  the  ACP  share declined  to  the  benefit of  the 
industrialized countries and  the  developing  countries of -45-
of Latin America  and Asia.  The  tables  in Annex  4  illustrate 
this disquieting  trend. 
In  the  coffee sector,  Latin American  losses are  the direct 
consequence of very hard  frosts  on  the Brazilian plantations. 
The  improved  ACP  share of the cotton market reflects the 
decline  in Asia  - the Asian nations process an  increasing 
amount of their cotton themselves.  The  same  goes  for hides 
and  skins,  but  in  terms of volume  exported,  the  ACP  countries 
are not doing  as well  as  before with  these  two  products.  The 
African countries  have  improved  both their production and 
exports of tea. 
But  in other sectors,  the  ACP  record  is not really a  good 
one. 
International competition is not  the only reason  for  this, 
even  bearing  in mind  that,  faced with  the efforts of Asia and 
Latin America,  Africa  has  not developed  policies that are 
likely to increase its share of the  international markets. 
In Africa,  the  weakness  of the past decade  seems  to be  in 
production above all.  A  detailed analysis of the  causes of 
this  phenomenon  would  be  outside  the  scope of this document, 
but it is now  an  established fact- which  has  been  underlined 
by  many  studies by  international organizations,  the World 
Bank  in particular - that the general  causes of this 
deterioration are  the  same  as  those  which  led  to the critical 
situation  in African agriculture,  namely the effects of 
political strife, drought,  the  low priority which  many 
governments  and  aid donors  put on agriculture, debatable 
investment  choices,  excessively low official prices to  the 
producer,  and  so on. 
In  other words,  an  increasing part  (and  not  a  small  one 
either)  of Stabex  has,  from  the  very beginning,  been paid 
over,  not  to palliate  the  negative effects of short-term -~-
economic  phenomena,  but to  cope  with the  consequences of 
situations of  a  more  structural nature. 
Will  the  system be  able  to bear  the  costs  in  the  future, 
given  that,  because  of its very machinery,  this particular 
factor will probably be  of  increasing  importance  relative to 
other factors  that trigger applications? 
Requests arising  from  sudden drops  1n prices should,  of 
course,  gradually  fade  out and  the  tendency for prices to 
stagnate  should  also help bring  down  the  reference level of 
the main  products.  But  one  thing  is clear and  that is that 
all the protection systems  in  the world  cannot solve  the 
fundamental  problem of  competitivity in any field. 
============================================================= 
IV.  MINERAL  PRODUCTS  - PRESERVING  PRODUCTION  CAPACITY  WITH 
SYSMIN 
============================================================= 
When  the  negotiations  for  renewal  of  Lome  I  took place,  the 
ACP  and  EEC  partners called  for  a  system of export earnings 
stabilization for mineral  products along  the  same  lines as 
Stabex.  The  mining  sector is  indeed  of particular  interest 
to certain of  the  ACP  countries,  which  often have  no 
significant export possibilities other than their mineral 
resources  (this is  true of,  for example,  Mauritania,  with its 
iron ore). 
The  European  commission  had  not  in  fact excluded  minerals 
from  the  proposals it made  on  Stabex  when  it brought out its 
memorandum  in  1973  prior to  the  opening  of  the first  Lome 
negotiations.  It was  later on  that Member  States  came  out in 
favour  of  withdrawing  mineral  products  from  the  sytem. -47-
Helmut  Schmidt relaunched  the  idea  in  a  speech  in  Lusaka, 
when  he  suggested  extending Stabex  to include  copper.  So  it 
was  difficult for  the  Commmunity  not to provide  some  sort of 
machinery to insure  the  ACP  countries against drops  in 
mineral  export earnings,  particularly since the mineral-
producing countries were  penalized  as  regards  compensation 
for  agricultural products  (mineral  products  representing an 
important part of total exports and  agricultural products not 
representing  a  large enough percentage  to qualify for 
Stabex). 
The  mining  sector has  characteristics of its own.  The  Stabex 
system could  not be  extended  to products  for which it was  not 
suitable  (iron ore will  be  struck off the  Stabex lists in 
1985)  and  the result is a  system which  is aimed  at preserving 
export earnings but which  works  completely differently -
although the  fact that it looks like Stabex means  that it is 
difficult to understand  and  not very popular. 
Principles  and  characteristics of  Sysmin 
So  Lome  contains  a  new title, on minerals,  in which  an  inter-
vention  system  for mineral products,  Sysmin,  plays  a  central 
part.  The  key element  in  the  system is production capacity. 
The  world mineral market is subject to cyclical variations of 
considerable magnitude  deriving  from  the structure of world 
supply and  the  very great sensitivity of this sector to the 
industrial situation. 
So  the  idea is not to maintain  the  volume  of production at 
all costs  in  this field where  over-production is by  no  means 
rare.  This  would  only  increase  the  imbalance  and  depress 
prices  further.  What it is about is keeping  the  production 
or export  (this  in  fact means  transport routes)  capacity as 
intact as possible  so as  to enable  the  countries  in question 
to  take  advantage of the situation once  balance  has  been 
re-established  on  the  market. -48-
As  production capacity can  be  affected not only by accidental 
and  political events,  but also by  temporary but severe 
economic  slumps,  Sysmin  covers all these  cases.  However, 
unlike accidents,  for which  rapid  technical  findings  can  be 
established,  the effect of economic  circumstances  (a  drop  in 
export earnings,  say)  on  production capacity calls for  a 
thorough analysis of  the  whole  sector.  This  has  to be  done 
to see  how  far  Sysmin  can  help re-establish economic 
viability in  the  sector, where  it has  been  temporarily 
compromised  by  circumstances outside the  control of the  ACP 
State  in question. 
Although much  of the  Stabex machinery  comes  into play 
automatically,  the  same  is not true of  Sysmin. 
The  system contains  special provisions to avoid assistance 
being either scattered over  too wide  an  area or concentrated 
into too small  a  one.  So  the only products  covered are  those 
which  regularly represent more  than  15  % of  an  ACP  country's 
total exports  and  10  % in  the  case of  the  least-developed, 
land-locked  and  island countries.  No  intervention may  amount 
to more  than  50  % of each of  the  five  annual  endowments. 
There  are other provisions  to ensure  that the  system is only 
used  in serious cases  (the drop  in capacity must  be  10  %) 
and,  to restrict its field of application  (in particular the 
list of products  covered  and  the  procedure  for  including  new 
products  if need  be).  When  the  Convention  took effect,  the 
products covered were 




- bauxite  and  alumina; 
- iron ore. -G-
Experience  has  proved  that all these provisions provide  a 
coherent  framework  for allocation of Sysmin  funds,  which 
total  282  million  ECU  for  the  duration of  the  Convention. 
However,  it could  be  argued  that,  if this amount  were larger, 
there would  be  no  need  to exclude products  (nickel,  chrome 
etc)  which,  although  they do  not  reach  the  dependence 
thresholds, still make  a  considerable contribution to 
development  in  the  ACP  countries. 
This  regulatory framework  cannot be  reduced  to an  automatic 
process  that could  well  be misused  for the  benefit of major 
mining  companies.  It is known  that a  certain number of 
multinationals,  whose  technical and  commercial  knowhow  means 
they play an  important part on  the  world  minerals  scene, 
would  be  quite capable of taking  advantage of a  system that 
was  triggered  without any  thorough,  case-by-case analysis of 
the  sector in question.  This  is not  the  aim of the  Lome 
Convention. 
In  fact neither the  assessment of the  damage  to  the  ACP 
country's production  and  export capacity nor  the analysis of 
the projects and  programmes  destined  to  improve  the situation 
in  the mining  sector in difficulty is an  automatic process. 
Even  the  way  funds  are  used  - loans on extremely soft terms 
(special  loans are at 1  % over 40  years,  with  a  10-year grace 
period)  - can  vary.  The  conditions may  be  applied as  they 
stand if the  funds  are  to go  to,  say,  a  training programme, 
and  they may  be  transformed  (two-stage loans  to obtain a 
booster effect)  by allocating part of  the grant component of 
special  loans  to social  programmes  (housing,  health and  so 
on),  as mining  investments  in  the strict sense of the  term 
can  sometimes  cope  with  financial  conditions that are closer 
to  those  of the market. 
Lastly,  when  a  preliminary analysis reveals  a  need  for 
conservatory measures,  in cases of accidents,  for example, 
advances  may  be  made. -50-
The  record  so  far  illustrates the  imperfections  of  the  system 
Just two  interventions  financed  in  four  years of operation of 
Sysmin  and  five  more  dossiers  under  investigation - this 
modest  record  is enough  to underline  the  fact that the  system 
calls for  improvement,  although the  interventions,  by their 
very nature,  cannot run  into large  numbers  because  they have 
to be  concentrated  on  very serious cases. 
Although experience  is short,  it has  shown  that a  Sysmin 
contribution to salvage  and  rehabilitation operations should 
be  fairly substantial if it is to encourage  what  is often  a 
necessary reorganization of  the sector;  the  schemes  in  zaire 
(40  million  ECU)  and  Zambia  (51  million ECU)  only represented 
around  10  % of  the  total amounts  needed,  which  were  enormous. 
The  EEC-ACP  negotiations  for  renewal of  the  Lome  Convention 
should make  one  or  two  changes  to the  Sysmin  system.  It 
would  be  desirable,  in particular,  to drop certain rules that 
have  been  copied  from  Stabex  and  which  mean  that the 
instrument  is not really suitable as it stands. 
At all events,  Sysmin  can only be  one  of  the  instruments  used 
to safeguard  the  means  of production.  The  Lome  Convention 
has  provided other  intervention machinery,  EIB  loans,  for 
example,  and private  investments.  In  a  communication to the 
Council  in  November  1983,  the  European  Commission  pleaded  in 
favour  of  introducing  mining  strategies in the  ACP  countries 
and  fitting  Sysmin  in with  a  whole  series of  financial 
instruments  (existing or to be  created),  mentioning,  by  way 
of example,  the grants  and  special  loans  from  the  European 
Development  Fund,  the  EIB's  loans  and  risk capital,  ECSC 
credits,  the  Community  budget,  specific agreements  and,  of 
course,  Sysmin. -51-
============================================================= 
V.  THE  SUGAR  PROTOCOL 
============================================================= 
The  members  of  the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement  were 
particularly worried  about it running out,  on  28  February 
1975,  as this meant  an  end  to the quota  system  from  which 
they benefited  for  their consignments  to the British market. 
They  ultimately found  their guaranteee  in  the  Lome  Convention, 
in the  sugar protocol.  But as  far as  the current world 
economic  situation is concerned,  this protocol  is in some 
ways  an  economic  aberration and,  in  the eyes of  some,  a  legal 
monstrosity. 
The  sugar protocol was  based on  an  assumption  by  the 
Community  that a  rapid return to economic  growth would  lead 
to a  rise  in  the  standard of living in the developing 
countries.  And  greater purchasing  power  means  higher per 
capita sugar  consumption.  Even  if prices on  the  world  sugar 
market did  not  stay at the heights  they reached  in 1974,  the 
year when  Lome  I  was  negotiated, it was  reasonable  to expect 
demand  to  be  sustained with  the arrival on  the  market of a 
vast reserve of  consumers  in  the  shape of the  inhabitants of 
the  Third World. 
Everything  was  based  on this. 
But,  as  we  know,  recovery is proving  slow  and  the developing 
countries are  bogged  down  in  unprecedented  financial 
difficulties.  In  these  circumstances,  purchasing  ACP  sugar 
at guaranteed prices is an  economic  solution which  is open  to 
criticism. -52-
A  commitment  to purchase  and  to supply at guaranteed prices 
The  protocol  provides  for  the  EEC  to buy  1  225  000  t  of cane 
sugar  (white  sugar value)  from  the  ACP  producers,  plus  25  000  t 
from  India,  which  is covered  by  identical arrangements,  and 
54  200  t  from  two  overseas countries  and  territories, every 
year. 
The  Community  undertook  to buy quantities and  the  ACP 
countries,  for  their part,  undertook to supply them.  This  is 
the  contractual character of the protocol.  If  an  ACP  country 
is unable  to deliver its agreed quantity in full  then  that 
quantity is reduced  for  each subsequent delivery period  and 
the  shortfall may  be  redistributed amongst other suppliers. 
The  ACP  country in question may  still claim reasons of  force 
majeure,  i.e. circumstances  brought  about  by causes outside 
the  control of  the exporting  country and  which are  not  the 
result of its reducing  its own  production or withdrawing its 
own  sugar supplies.  If  the  Commission  accepts  the  claim,  the 
country's quota  is not  reduced. 
Although  the  sugar protocol  was  annexed  to  Lome  I  and  then  Lome 
II, each of which  was  established for  five years, it runs  for 
an  unspecified  period.  This gives it an existence of its own, 
in  a  way,  in spite of the  fact  that one of its articles enables 
the  parties to denounce  it after five  years,  subject to  two 
years'  notice. 
Prices on  the  world  sugar market are  badly depressed  and  the 
development of  the  production of artificial sweeteners,  both 
in  the  Community  and  in other major  consumer  countries,  such 
as  the  USA,  has  helped  make  the  situation worse. 
Add  to this the  investments  made  rather  too readily in sugar 
production in certain ACP  countries swelling supply still 
further  (in  some  cases with the  help of Member  States of the 
EEC),  and  you  have  some  idea of the  unfavourable  economic -53-
situation facing  ACP  sugar exports made  outside the  EEC's 
guaranteed  purchase  arrangements or other bilateral supply 
contracts. 
Given  current  low world prices,  the  sugar protocol  is still 
vitally important for certain of  the  ACP  countries, 
particularly Mauritius  and Fiji, whose  economies  are based 
almost solely on  sugar.  Is  this to  the  Community's  credit? 
Some  ACP  countries do  not think so and  they blame  the  EEC  for 
depressing prices on  the world  market by exporting  its own 
surplus. 
The  basic  legal contradiction  in the  protocol 
Sugar  is a  regular  bone of contention between Brussels and 
its ACP  partners.  The  dispute  is based  on  a  legal contra-
diction of  no  mean  proportions.  The  protocol provides  for 
the guaranteed prices to be  indexed  to the  Community  prices 
which  the  Ten decide  every year within the  framework of the 
common  agricultural policy.  The  system is absolutely  rigid 
here,  as it allows  for  no  intervention  from  outside  the 
Community.  As,  at the  same  time,  the  protocol provides for 
the possibility of negotiaiton,  the  way  is paved  for 
misunderstandings.  How  is it possible  to negotiate  something 
that is not negotiable  ? 
The  economic  side  is not so clear-cut either.  If  the  annual 
price  increase  cannot be  higher  than that granted  to  the 
European  producers,  then,  if the  EEC  implements  a  price 
policy that restricts production,  its effects will automa-
tically be  felt by  the  ACP  countries. 
In addition,  European  farmers  are achieving  far higher yields 
than their ACP  counterparts.  So  the  European  farmer will  be 
able  to maintain his  income  by producing more,  even  if he 
gets less for his sugarbeet,  but the  ACP  farmer will see his 
income  drop.  Will  the  ACP  countries not reach the point 
where  the  costs of production are greater than their  income? -~-
PART  IV 
============================================================= 
THE  SCOPE  AND  LIMITATIONS  OF  STABEX 
============================================================= 
Maligned  by  some,  praised  by others,  Stabex is probably 
over-criticised as well as over-praised.  The  prettiest girl 
in the world  can only give  what she's got,  the  saying goes, 
and  the  system cannot be  expected  to produce miracles for 
which it is not and  cannot be  designed. 
The  EEC's  Stabex  remains  a  limited  instrument  in that no 
export earnings stabilization system can  hope  to solve  a 
world-wide  problem when  its field of application is a 
regional one. 
However,  although its financial  means  have  not always  been 
enough  for it to meet all the  ACP  requests,  it has given  them 
precious help in sectors hard-hit by  problems of production 
or the  economic  situation. 
And  above all,  the  system has  had  the merit of exploring  an 
avenue  which  the  international  community  could  follow  in an 
attempt to compensate  for  the  catastrophic variations in the 
developing  countries's foreign earnings. 
If immobility is often a  comfortable position to adopt, 
action nearly always  leads to criticism.  We  can  look at the 
different accusations that have  been  levelled at Stabex  to 
try and  analyse  in greater detail the  role assigned  to the 
system and  the  limitations imposed  on it by its nature. -55-
Stabex  and  price stabilization 
One  of the  commonest  criticisms is that the  system does  not 
stabilize the price of the  commodities it covers. 
But Stabex was  not designed  to stabilize prices.  It was 
designed  to stabilize export earnings.  These  are of course 
affected  by price movements,  but also by  the quantities 
exported.  Stabex will  in fact compensate  for any  loss in 
income  caused  by  a  drop  in export prices,  provided  that the 
effect of this drop on export earnings has  not been 
compensated  for  by  an  increase  in  the quantities exported. 
And  vice  versa  when  the drop in earnings is caused  by  a 
reduction  in  the  volume  exported. 
Stabex and  balance  of  payments  deficits 
The  system was  not designed  to solve the  problem of these 
deficits and  does  not claim to be  a  substitute for  the  IMF  in 
this matter. 
Stabex and  the  terms  of  trade 
It is not the  sytem~ role to alter the  terms of trade  in the 
recipient countries'  favour.  Furthermore,  the difficulties 
of defining and measuring  any  trend  in the  terms of trade are 
well  known  and  even  if it were possible to overcome  them,  it 
would  probably not be  a  good  idea to index  the  transfers. 
The  system has  not  reduced  the  gap  between  the per capita GNP 
in the  ACP  States and  that in the  EEC 
This  is a  very general  demand  to make  of a  system that only 
applies to a  restricted area of the economy  of the ACP 
countries.  Moreover,  the  system is only one aspect of  Lome 
policy.  The  question of knowing  how  to measure  the effect of -56-
Stabex  on  the  development  gap would  therefore be  a  difficult 
one  to answer. 
The  system is  intended  to support  "the stability,profitabi-
lity and  sustained growth",  of  the  ACP  economies  (Lome 
Convention,  Article 23(1))  on  the  assumption  that  these  aims 
are  threatened  by  the  instability of export earnings  from 
products  covered  by the  system.  However,  it does  not 
guarantee  the realization of these objectives,  however 
desirable  that may  be. 
The  system neglects  commodities  that are  important  to  the  ACP 
countries 
The  system  includes  almost all the agricultural export 
products  that are of importance  to  the  ACP  countries.  Tobacco 
is the exception.  Mineral  products are also excluded,  but, 
as we  have  seen,  they pose  problems of a  different order and 
are  covered  by Sysmin. 
The  system,  which  concentrates on  raw  materials  that are 
vital to  European  industry,  could  encourage  ACP  dependence  on 
traditional exports  to  the  detriment of their food  crops, 
which  would  interfere with  the  ACP  aim of diversifying. 
Lome  II specifically provides  for Stabex  transfers  to go  to 
diversification projects.  In  practice,  a  considerable 
percentage of  the  transfers has  been  used  outside  the  product 
sector for  which  they were  made. 
It is also worth  remembering  that  the decision on  how  the 
Stabex  transfers are  to  be  used  is  the  responsibility  of the 
recipient country.  The  argument  falls down  if we  remember 
that  the  system also covers  products which  the  Community  does 
not really depend  on at all. -57-
Stabex transfers are  inadequate  to compensate  for  loss of 
earnings  by  the  producer or loss of  employment  in the sector 
of  the  product  in question.  This  is a  question that can  be 
dealt with at various  levels.  First of all, it is indeed 
possible,  for  technical reasons,  for  the risk that has  been 
recognized and  covered  by  the  system to be  smaller than  the 
payment anticipated  in  the  light of  the original application 
for  a  transfer. 
Furthermore,  1980  and  1981  showed  that a  recognized  risk, 
according  to Stabex  rules,  is not always  covered  by available 
funds.  However,  it should  be  noted  that the crisis of 1980 
and  1981  had  its origins in what were  really exceptional 
conditions - a  considerable price fall coinciding with a  drop 
in the quantities actually exported of  two very  important 
export products. 
Over  and  above  these  technical and  financial considerations, 
the  supposed  inadequacy of  the  transfers as sectoral  remedies 
can often be  explained  by  the  way  the  recipient states use 
them  in their economies.  If  the  funds  are channelled  into 
diversification,  then  they obviously are  no  longer available 
to the  sector in which  the  loss of earnings occurred. 
However,  it must  be  emphasized  that what  we  have  here  is 
deliberate deflection by  the  ACP  country choosing  how  the 
transfer in question is to be  used. 
"If the  ideas  - about  a  new  international economic order-
that were  current at the  time  when  Stabex was  invented  had 
been  followed  up,  if there  had  been  an  international effort 
to get on  and  regulate  the markets,  then  the  sytem would  have 
been  a  quite  remarkable  instrument because it would  have 
added  its guarantee  to  the  stabilization of prices.  But 
Stabex  has  had  to operate with  international markets  in 
disorder and  today it is being called  upon  to perform  two 
tasks - providing general stabilization and  insuring against -58-
short-term economic  setbacks  - when  it was  only designed  to 
do  the  latter  ,  not the  former." 
This extract from  a  speech  that Edgard  Pisani,  the  European 
commissioner  responsible  for  the  EEC's  development policy, 
made  in Berlin in September  1983,  only a  few  days  before  the 
opening  of negotiations on  renewal  of  Lome  II, gives  an  exact 
picture of  the  situation facing  Stabex. 
But,  to pursue  this train of  thought,  we  could well  ask what 
has  caused  the  disorder on  the  world  markets  which  Mr  Pisani 
mentions.  The  answer  is the  instability and  unregulated 
state of  the  world  economy  since  the early seventies,  which 
gradually led  to recession in  the  industrialized countries of 
the west,  the  main  customers  for  the Third World's 
commodities. 
There  is no  doubt that,  had  this note  been  drafted against 
the  background  of  the  growth of  the sixties,  then  the  tone 
would  have  been quite different and  the  system might well  not 
have  been  needed. 
As  things stand,  no  instrument can  claim to  solve  the  immense 
problems  facing  a  world  currently struggling  to develop.  And 
Stabex  can only serve  the  purpose  for which it was  created. 
It is one  of  a  number  of ways  of encouraging  a  kind  of 
development  that is self-sustaining and  at the  same  time 
competitive. 
There  is one  serious question here.  Have  not  some  forms  of 
development aid contributed  to  the  decline  in competitiveness 
of ACP  commodity exports that has  been  recorded  over  the  past 
decade?  When  Development  Commissioner  Edgard  Pisani made  his 
speech at the  opening of  the  negotiations of  renewal  of  Lome 
II  in October  1983,  he  had  no  hesitation in saying  that  : 
"The  real  cause of the  decline of Stabex  is the decline of 
the  ACP  productive  system". -$-
Without claiming  that the  system has  in any  way  contributed 
to this decline  (studies exist showing  this not to be  the 
case),  it would  be  as well  to remember  the general rule that 
instruments of development aid  should never  be easy answers 
that encourage  slackness and  loss of competitiveness  in 
recipient  countries. ANNEX  I 
1.  Groundnuts,  shelled or not 
2.  Groundnut oil 
3.  Cocoa beans 
4.  Cocoa paste 
5.  Cocoa butter 
6.  Raw or roasted coffee 
7.  Extracts, essences or concen-
trates of coffee 
8.  Cotton,  not carded or cClllbed 
9 •  Cotton linters 
10.  Coconuts 
ll. Copra 
12.  Coconut oil 
13.  Palm oil 
14.  Palm nut and kernel oil 
15.  Palm nuts and  kernels 
16.  Raw  hides and skins 
17.  Bovine cattle leather 
18.  Sheep and  lamb skin 
19.  Goat and kid skin leather 
20.  WJod  in the rough 
21.  WJod  roughly squared or half-
squared,  but not further 
manufactured 
22.  WJod  sawn  lengthwise,  but not 
further prepared 
23.  Fresh  bananas 
25.  Raw  sisal 
26.  Vanilla 
-60-
27.  Cloves- whole fruit, 
cloves and  stems 
28.  Sheep's or lambs'  wool, 
notcardedorcanbed 
29.  Fine animal hair of Angora 
goats - m::>hair 
30.  Q.un arabic 
31.  Pyrethrun - flcr.r<ers, 
leaves, stems, peel and 
roots;  saps and extracts 
of pyrethrun 
32.  Essential oils, not 
terpeneless, of cloves, 
of niaouli and  of ylang-
ylang 
33.  Sesame  seed 
34.  cashew nuts and kernels 
35.  PeJ;Per 
36.  Shrimps 
37.  Squid 
38.  Cotton seeds 
39.  Oil seeds 
40.  Rubber 
41.  Peas 
42.  Beans 
43.  lentils 
44.  Iron ore (ores,  concentra-
tes and  roasted iron 
pyrites) 
45.  Karite nuts and  kernels 
46.  Nutmeg 
47.  Mace -61-
ANNEX  II 
'!HE  NJ?  STATES 
ANI'IG.JA  &  BARBllil!l. 
BAHAMAS 
GRENAill\  SNJ '1Q!E  &  PRINCIPE 
GUINEA  SENEXiAL 
BARBAIXJS  GUINEA  BISSAU  SEYCHELLES 
BELIZE  GUYANA  SIERRA ~ 
BENIN  IVORY  COI\ST  SOI.tM:N  !SlANtS 
BOl'SWANA  JAMAICA  SGlALIA 
BURUNDI  KENYA  SUDI\N 
c~  KIRIBATI  SURINAME 
CAPE  VERDE 
CENI'RAL  AFRICAN 
r..ESCT.mO  SWAZilAND 
LIBERIA  TANZANIA 
RERJBLIC  MAIY\GASCAR  ~ 
CHAD  MAlAWI  ~ 
C<M>Ral  MALI  TRINI!llill  &  'lWAGJ 
CCHD  MAURITANIA  'lUVAW 
DJIBCXJI'I  MAURITIUS  001\Nil'\. 
J:Xl.UNICA 
EOOA'IDRIAL  GUINEA 
E'IHIOPIA 
NIGER  UPPER  VOIJl'A 
NIGERIA  WES'ffiRN  SAMOA 
PARJA  NEW  GUINEA  VANUA'lU 
FIJI  !MANDl\.  ZAIRE 
GA&N  ST .CHRIS'IOPHER  &  NEVIS  ZAMBIA 
GAMBIA  ST.UJCIA  ZIMBAEME 
GHANA  ST.  VINCENT  &  GRENADINES 
a)  The least-developed ACP  States 
Benin  Niger 
Botswana  Rwanda 
Burundi  Sao 'lbme  and Principe 
Cape Verde  Seychelles 
Central African Republic  Sierra Leone 
Chad  Solaocll1  Islands 
Conoros  Somalia 
Djibouti  St IJJ.cia 
Dominica  Sudan 
Ethiopia  swaziland 
GmiD~  ~n~n~ 
Grenada  'lbgo 
Guinea  'lbnga 
Guinea Bissau  TUvalu 
Lesotho  Uganda 
Malawi  Upper Volta 
Mali  Western Samoa 
b)  landlocked NJ.>  States 
Botswana 
Burundi 






















ANNEX  II I 
Total transfers under rate I  &  II  (1975-82  inclusive)  in ECU  ' 
8  - STA  EX  TRANSFERS  1975  82 
ACP  STATE  POO!XJCr  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  rorAL 
BD<IN  GBOONr.NUTS  464.330  464.330 
COFFEE  1.174.883  1.174.883 
conrn  4.299.347  2.750.347  2.083.137  880.982  349.246  130.169  877.329 11.370.766 
OIICAKE  1.191.079  1.191.079 
PAIM  OIL  765.576  1.467,364  254.585  1.614.442  4,102.467 
PAlM  lOOINEL  OIL  1.211. 826  3. 728.394  544.668  5,484.888 
CA<llll><  NUl'S  215.789  215.789 
"'tal  7.129.848  3.515.923  4.762.327  4.609.376  349.246  929.422  2.  708.060  24,004.202 
BURIJNDI  conrn  965.602  965.602 
H  :rJ:ES  &  SKINS  520.053  520.053 
COFFEE  11.023.569  11.023.569 
"'tal  1.485.655  11.023,569  12.509.224 
CAMEBOCN  P<l.G! TIMBER  3,601.423  3.601.423 
CIXX>I  PASTE  463,558  463.558 
COFFEE  6.988.461  6,988.461 
CIXX>I  PRJ<OClS  10.348.448  10.348.448 
"'tal  3.601.423  463.558  17.336.909  21.401.890 
CAPE  VERIE  BANANAS  347.712  429.500  429.352  214.764  1.421.328 
CAR  conrn  3,079.660  3.846.980  1.675.896  8.602.536 
COFFEE  353.108  968.396  1.536.  796  2.858.300 
SAiO<  TIMBER  549.807  549.807 
"'tal  353.108  549.807  3.079.660  3.846.980  968.396  1.536.  796  1.675.896 12.010.643 
CXM:R:6  COPRA  246.447  290.577  293.528  830.552 
ESSEN!'IAL OilS  852.402  487.471  1.339.873 
"'tal  1.098,849  778.048  293.528  2.170.425 
earn  P<l.G!  TIMBER  7.361.677  7.361.677 
"""" CC>\ST 
P<J,G! TIMBER  15,000.000  15.000.000 
COFFEE  9.195.390 35.329.724  54,525.114 
"'tal  15.000.000  9,195,390  35.329.724  69.525.114 
OCMINICA  BANANAS  2.527.944  2.527.944 
C<XXNfr  502.143  502.143 
PRJ<OClS 
~1  2.527.944  502.143  3,030.087 
E'IHIOPIA  COFFEE  9.339.684  968.702  10.308.386 
HIDES  &  SKINS  5,080.365  5.080.365 
"'tal  14.420.049  968.702  15,388.751 
FIJI  cc:x:xHJI'  OIL  615.140  1.499.834  842.296  653.391  788.481  4.399.142 
GABCN  I<XX>i  TIMBER  6.  703.311  6,703.311 -63-
ACP  STATE  PRJWCr  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  """" 
GN!BIA  <ll<lllliNmi  2.488.664  3. 791.992  2,225.089  8.505.745 
GKUmiDl' OIL  3.999.947  3.191.205  1.440.360  1,615.183 10,246.695 
rlUJNlN11"  MEAL  1.026.143  1.134.175  529.741  361.036  3,051.095 
Total  2.448.664  5.026.090  8.117.372  4.195.190  1.976.219 21.803,535 
GHAN1\  KUli!TIMBER  5.176.408 
~1.160.673 
5.176.408 
=  PllOilJCl'S  2. 776.692 
Total  5.176.408  32.776.692  31.160.673 69" 113.773 
GRENA!l'l  NV1>!EXl  &  MACE  197.531  278.590  476.121 
= 
1.318.965  1.318.965 
Total  197.531  1.597.555  1.  795.086 
GUINEA  GI<lJNINlJl'S  4.442.437  3.591.506  2.480.509  1.259.747  1.  774.199 
BlSSA!J  PAIM  KERNELS  626.966  273.919  360.528  1,261.413 
SlOiN  TIMBER  146.839  88.719  235.558 
Total  5.069.403  146.839  3.591.506  2.480.509  1.533.666  449.247  3.271.170 
UPPER  VOI.li'A GI<lJNINlJl'S  685.239  1.169.977  2.890.160  4.745.376 
CC1l'KN  175.936  2.340,590  2.516.526 
KARlTE NtH'S  1.046.  734  1.046,734 
Total  861.175  1.169.971  5.230.750  1.046.  734  8.308,636 
JI\MAICA  BAlWII\S  3.238.995  3.238.995 
KrnYA  OOFFEE  0.032.204  1.054.231  ~1.086.435 
KIRIBATI  COPRA  497.742  1.036.682  1.534.424 
LGlOIID  !OIAIR  242.279  354.533  694.147  1.290.959 
LIBEIUA  IOCN  ORE  7.586.943  7.586.943 
MAll1\GASCAR  SISAL  1.  762.943  1.  762.943 
ClOVES  1.139.516  1.139.516 
VANILIA  2,845.088  1.211.202  4,056.290 
COFFEE  3.440.826  3.440.826 
Total  2.902.459  2.845.088.  1.211.202  3.440.826  0.399.575 
MAIAAI  TFA  1.330.961  653.391  1.984.352 
G!OJNIWI'S  2. 684. 355  2.684.355 
Total  1.330.961  653.391  2.684. 355  4,668. 707 
MALI  CC1l'KN  1.145.004  1.145.004 
puM-ARABIC  848.489  848.489 
GI<UnNlJl'S  3.893.154  3.894.154  7.787.410 
POOD.  2.551.615  2.551.615 
KAIUTE  NtH'S  653.391  653.391 
f'lommtJr  OIL  3.548.554  3,548.554 
Total  1.145.004  848.489  3.893.154  3.894.154  2. 551.615  653.39],_  3.548.554  6.534.463 -64-
ACP  STA're  PROOJCT  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  !982  '!OrAL 
MAJJRlT1\NIA  IIW ORE  3.605.602 33.394.848  37.000.450 
NIGER  GIO.JNIN1IS  5.441.294  2.412.379  7.853.673 
HIDES  &  SKINS  507.747  507.747 
GFDJNrHn' OIL  6.755.991  7.383.280  14.139.271 
OIIJ::AKE  153.269  153.269 
"'tal  5.949.041  6.909.260  9. 795,659  22.653.960 
UGANDI\  oorro<  1.  748.932  2.249.791  1.287,985  3.125.543  3.806.872  12.219.!23 
TFA  1.399.953  3.882.924  3,093.453  8.376.330 
"'tal  1.  748,932  3.649.  744  1.287,985  7.008.467  6.900.325  20.595.453 
PAPUA""'  OOFFEE  9.421.513 16.344.44  25.765.958 
GUINFA  co::<l<  5.738.012  4.201,08  9.939.093 
COPRA  1.385.695  1.385.695 
COCCH1I'  OIL  1.160.130  1.160.130 
COPRA  PPOIJ.K:TE.  3.604.03  3.604.036 
"'tal  17.705.350  24.149.56  41.854.912 
llHANil'l  PYR!."1HR[>I  608.802  608.802 
COFFEE  6.555,031  653.391  7.208.422 
"'tal  608.802  6.555.03  653.391  7.817.224 
SOUJm IS  COPRA  723.321  1.  726.63'  2.449.954 
WES'l'ERN  =  276.978  780.625  1.222.99  1.170.846  561.80  4.013.244 
s""""  c<PRA  1.331.544  1.035.401  877.43  3.244.379 
RCU>ITIMBER  348.993  346.993 
BANANAS  99.313  99.313 
"'tal  276.978  1.680.537  99.313  780.625  1.222.990  2.206.247  1.439.23  7.705.929 
SNl """"'  = 
994.895  2.679.18€  3.674.083 
SrnroAL  GIUJNIOIL  49.882.295  49.882.295 
OIIJ::AKE  15.224.094  15.224.094 
GI<XJNIWr  30.353.160 26.272.999  56.626.159  ·=  "'tal  65.106.389  30.353.389 26.272.999  21.732.548 
SIERRA  IIW ORE  3.997.274  3.977.274 
[.rolE  PIM\ ~I.S  947.774  947.774 
PAlM  KERNElS  PR.  1.082.263  1.082.263 
COCO\  53.351  2.447.38  2.500.732 
COFFEE  3.831.24  3.831.246 
"'tal  3.997.274  947.774  1.135.614  6.278.62  12.339.289 
S<>IALIA  BANANAS  1.296.907  1.423.385  949.211  3.669.503 
HIIJfS  &  SKINS  653.238  415.854  1.051.092 
"'tal  I  1.932.145  1.839.239  949.211  4.720.595 -65-
>.cP  STATE  ~  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
SUili\N  GR:mlH1l'S  968. 82!  9.325.911 27.190.12 
HIDES  &  SKillS  1.658.580 
SASilOl  SEErS  2.632.92 
<:CJl'IDl 
Total  1.658.580  968.82  9.325.911 29.823.04! 
STE  W:::IE  ........ 
SWAZilAND  I!QI OOE  3.368.878  5.490.459  4.365.53 
<:CJl'IDl 
Total  3.368.878  5.490.459  4.365.53l 
TAN"ll\NIA  <:CJl'IDl  1.887.082 
SISAL  5.165.208  8.176.614  5.472.645 
COFFEE 
Total  1.887.082  5.165.208  8.176.61  5.472.645 
CHAD  <:CJl'IDl  4.671.608  2.664.58 
=  COFFEE  2.680.324  946.290 
COCO!< 
"l'>tal  2.680.324  946.290 
T<N;A  C<JIRA  831.720 
BAIWIAS  72.719  244,919 
VANILlA  58.63 
COPRA  PIWJCTS 
ccx:cwr 
COCUiiJlS 
Total  904.439  244.919  58.63 
TAVAJJJ  COPRAH 
GRAND"lUl'AL  9.985.880 37.135.93  33.729.73  63.960.618 62.683.54 
(1)  including a  9hare  in the additional 40 million OCU  exceptional financint;J 
decided by the ACP-EEX:  Council  in Libreville  (13  &  14  May  1982) 
( 2)  transfers paid retroactively fran the 1982 allocation. 
1980  1981  1982  '!UrAL 
13.415.56  50.900.421 
1.568.580 
2.632.923 
10.879.03C  10.879,030 
13.415. 56(  10.879.030  66.070.954 
1.349.53  1.349.538 
13.224.869 
3.103.96  3.103.968 
3.103.  96!  16.328.837 
1.887,080 
18.814.467 
6.254.95  694.174  6.949.131 
6.254.95  694.174  27.650.680 
2.539.84  3.593.16  13.469.205 
3.626.614 
7,115,33  7.115.332 
7.115.3~ 10.741.946 
1.685.13  2.516.854 
223.17  540,8ll 
58.632 
602.235  602.239 
39!.68  391.688 
365.32  365.327 
602.23  2,665.32  4.475.551 
14.49  56.606  63.15(  134.251 
p7.975.90  83.631.758 71.313.6-C  70.417.013 -66-
ANNEX  4 
STATISTICAL  TABLES 
Table 1. - EEC  imports 
of main Stabex products 
Table 2.  - EEC  imports 
of main Stabex products 
from ACP states  (volume) 
(at current values) 
Value  Average annual 
of imports  growth rate  (%) 
Product  in current $ ·ooo  over the period 
Average  Average 
Value  Price  Volume 
I 
1971-72-73 1979-80-81 
Imports from  ACP 
All 
1mports 
Average  Average  Average  Average 
Products 
1971-72-73  1979-80-81  yearly  yearly 
growth  growth 
·ooo  '000  over  over 
period  period  tonnes  tonnes  (%)  (%) 
Wood  466912  866 910  + 8.0  +  13.0  - 4.4 
Raw/roasted 
coffee  387 738  1680821  +20.1  +14.8  +  4.6 
Cocoa (all 
products)  369 851  1 556 965  +  19.7  +19.7  0.0 
Canon  132 139  239 258  +  7.7  +10.9  - 2.9 
Oilcake  106 046  118946  +  1.4  +  7.4  - 5.5 
Groundnuts 
rin  shelf  98 104  30429  -13.6  +  12.9  -23.6 
Groundnut oil  94 868  121  651  +  3.2  +11.0  - 7.1 
Fresh bananas  95 146  189617  + 9.0  +  14.0  - 4.4 
Tea  65058  181  767  +  13.7  +10.0  +  3.4 
Hides  52 836  94462  +  7.5  +  14.1  - 5.7 
Palm  oil  41124  76 780  + 8.1  +  11.4  - 3.0 
Rubber  38 720  101  801  + 12.8  +  13.1  - 0.2 
Wood  4415114  3 085 530  - 4.4  -2.5 
Rawfroasted coffee  367 066  527 161  +  4.6  +2.4 
Cocoa  beans  454 726  450 739  - 0.1  +0.7 
Con on  167 836  132 613  - 2.9  -2.6 
Oilcake  862 931  544 412  - 5.5  +6.8 
Groundnuts  in  shell  334 699  39277  -23.6  -3.5 
Groundnut  oils  210225  116696  - 7.1  -1.5 
Fresh  bananas  509 448  355 602  - 4.4  -1.3 
Tea  65278  85069  +  3.4  -0.8 
Hides and  skins  29 194  18 193  - 5.7  -4.3 
Palm  oil  155 503  122 348  - 3.0  +0.9 
Rubber  81624  80384  - 0.2  -0.1 
Sources: SITC  statistics  - Rev.  1 UN  Geneva. 
lrotaJ products 
listed  2 263 713  6 565 010  +14.2  - -
Table 3.  - ACP market shares 
Sources: SITC  - Rev.  1  - UN  Geneva  (DG  1).  in EEC  (9)  imports 
~----------------------
Trend over decade (volume) % 
(a)  average 1971-72-73-
(b)  average  1979-80-81 
Products  ACP  America  Asia  Total 
LOC 
Wood  (a)  68.4  6.1  24.7  100 
(b)  59.2  6.0  34.2  100 
Rawfroasted coffee  (a)  32.6  60.8  3.8  100 
(b)  38.8  54.6  6.3  100 
Cocoa  - all  products  (a)  93.3  5.5  0.1  100 
(b)  86.4  9.9  3.7  100 
of which  cocoa  beans  (a)  95.4  3.3  1.0  100 
(b)  88.8  7.4  3.8  100 
Cotton  (a)  32.5  34.9  21.4  100 
(b)  34.5  40.3  15.9  100 
Oilcake  (a)  21.9  48.1  27.5  100 
(b)  6.6  66.4  26.4  100 
Groundnuts in  shell  (a)  89.4  3.1  4.8  100 
(b)  34.6  49.9  10.7  100 
Groundnut oil  (a)  69.4  30.5  0.0  100 
(b)  44.7  53.3  1.8  100 
Fresh  bananas  (a)  25.3  60.7  0.0  100 
(b)  19.5  67.8  0.4  100 
Tea  (a)  27.4  3.1  63.6  100 
(b)  38.5  4.3  52.5  100 
Hides and  skins  (a)  29.4  37.5  20.8  100 
(b)  31.9  24.1  36.3  100 
Palm  oil  (a)  25.3  0.0  74.6  100 
(b)  18.5  0.2  81.2  100 
Rubber  (a)  11.9  0.1  87.8  100 
(b)  11.6  0.1  88.3  100 
Sources: SJTC  statistics  - Rev.  1 UN  Geneva. 